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ABSTRACT 
 
 
The determinants of capital structure choice of a firm have been highly discussed over 
the last 60 years. However, when the determinants of capital structure choice are related 
to a specific type of companies, the ones that undertake leveraged buyout operations, the 
field lacks more empirical evidence. Therefore, this dissertation aims to study the impact 
of the determinants of capital structure change, previously studied, after a leveraged 
buyout operation. Focusing on private European firms, this dissertation proves that the 
same determinants do not impact in the same way the capital structure for high-leveraged 
and non-high-leveraged firms; that determinants such as liquidity, business risk, 
profitability, taxation, tangibility and size do impact the capital structure change after a 
LBO and higher liquidity, larger company size, higher asset tangibility and profitability 
do explain why some LBO’s are more leveraged than others.  
 
Key-words: capital structure, determinants, private equity, leveraged buyouts, trade-off, 
pecking order. 
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SUMÁRIO 
 
A estrutura de capitais de uma empresa foi inicialmente apresentada como irrelevante 
para a rentabilidade da empresa pelo teorema de Miller e Modigliani. Com este teorema, 
resultou uma extensiva discussão acerca deste assunto. Devido ao vasto numero de 
estudos ficou empiricamente comprovado que a estrutura de capitais é importante para o 
valor da empresa e por tanto é necessário escolher a combinação de financiamento ótimo. 
Desta forma, os fatores que influenciam a escolha desta combinação, nomeadamente os 
determinantes de estrutura de capitais, passaram as ser vastamente estudados pela 
literatura. Embora, o extenso número de artigos neste tema, poucos foram os que se 
aventuraram a estudar as empresas privadas da União Europeia.  
Outra componente desta dissertação, é a compra alavancada de empresas, que consiste 
na compra das ações de uma empresa usando maioritariamente divida como 
financiamento. Este tipo de negocio existe há muito tempo, porém são poucos os estudos 
que tentam estudar a estrutura de capitais deste tipo de aquisições.  
 Este estudo visa contribuir ao reduzido número de estudos acerca dos determinantes 
de estrutura de capitais nas compras de alavancagem.  
 Os resultados desta dissertação demonstram que certos determinantes, como o 
investimento em ativos fixos, a tangibilidade, a dimensão da empresa e o imposto, entre 
outros, impactam a estrutura de capitais das empresas endividadas porem não na mesma 
forma que o seu impacto tem efeito numa empresa não-endividada. Também podemos 
concluir que os mesmos determinam impactam mais as empresas endividadas do que as 
não endividadas e que determinantes como a liquide e a tangibilidade (entres outros) 
conseguem explicar o porque de certas empresas que são adquiridas por alavancagem 
serem mais endividadas que outras. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Modigliani and Miller (1958) in their famous paper, brought a revolutionary view 
upon the conventional understanding of the capital structure. This pioneer view was 
followed by innumerous articles and studies that criticized and tried to state their thoughts 
on the topic. However, as much as it was criticized, this theorem opened a debated on a 
topic that until then no academic was interested in and so it lead to a journey of discovery 
and better understanding of this field.   
The progress that followed this initial paper lead to an extent amount of studies on 
optimal capital structure. Furthermore, it leads to other types of studies, not about the 
optimal capital structure but about the decision making behind that capital structure. 
Titman and Wessels (1988) started to question the behavior behind the capital structure 
choice. They as well as other authors presented alternative capital structure theories, such 
as the pecking order and the static trade-off theory, that tried to explain the way that 
companies chose their capital structure. With these theories, the academic authors started 
to research the determinants responsible for the capital structure choice.   
Even though, there are plenty articles on the determinants of capital structure, the 
same does not happen when the topic refers to a specific type of companies: firm’s that 
undertake a leveraged buyout operation. In this field, there are very little empirical 
evidence that proves which determinant impacts the capital structure of LBO firms.  
The object of this dissertation is to study the change of capital structure before and after 
a LBO operation in the target company and which factor impacts that process.  
The study will be structured in two main parts. The first part will aim to observe if the 
determinants of capital structure previously studied by other authors impact in the same 
way the capital structure of high leveraged (defined as those companies that have been 
target of a private equity firm in the last 10 years) and non-high-leveraged companies. 
Past studies have already determined some factors that impact the capital structure of the 
companies. However, the studies treated the impact of each factor as an average for the 
all sample of companies.  As it is widely known, the average is a statistical measure with 
some major disadvantages namely being sensitive to extreme values and it does not take 
into account the variability inside the sample. Therefore, the results presented by previous 
studies do not reflect the impact of a certain factor on individual types of companies.  
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The second part, will focus only on the subsample of leveraged companies that have 
been target of a private equity in the last 10 years.  Because some targets of LBO seem to 
be more leveraged than others, it will be interesting to analyze whether the determinants 
identified in the first part are those that impact the change on capital structure occurred 
after a LBO operation. It will provide answer to the following research questions: What 
are the determinants of the capital structure change after the LBO operation? What are 
the determinants of capital structure for high-leveraged and non-high-leveraged 
companies in Europe Union and how they impact the capital structure of such companies? 
Finally, why are some LBO target companies more leveraged than others? 
Beside this section, this report is structured as follows: in Section 2, a literature review 
on the topic of capital structure theories, determinants of capitals structure and leverage 
buyout operations is developed in a set of subsections. Then in Section 3 and 4 all the 
data and methodological aspects necessary for this dissertation are presented, 
respectively. In section 5, is presented the relevant descriptive statistics while in section 
6 the results of the empirical analysis are discussed. Finally, chapter 7 and 8 and 9 refer 
to the conclusion, references and appendixes, respectively, used in this report.  
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2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
In order to successfully build an explanatory model for this dissertation and answer 
the research questions, it is important to reflect on the previous literature produced in this 
field. As mentioned in the introduction, corporate capital structure and its determinants 
has been a highly discussed and studied topic by authors for more than fifty years. 
Considering the extensive amount of studies performed on this research topic it is not in 
the capacity of this dissertation to analyze the entire contribution made to this field. 
Therefore, this chapter will outline some of the main previous studies which possess 
relevant information for this dissertation and present the main theories developed on this 
topic since 1958. This chapter will be divided into three sections. In the first section, we 
will present the main corporate capital structure theories as well as its empirical evidence 
while in the second section we will describe the main theoretical and empirical studies 
produced on the determinants of capital structure. Finally, in the third part we will analyze 
the studies that are more similar and explanatory of the Leverage Buyout field. 
   
2.1 Capital Structure  
2.1.1 Defining Capital Structure 
 
Given the fact that corporate capital structure represents an important element of this 
dissertation it is necessary to understand its definition prior to proceeding to describe its 
theories and determinants. 
A company’s financial management team always face two types of financial 
decisions. The first one corresponds to the investment decisions and the second is the 
financing decisions. Thus, the capital structure of a company refers to how a company 
finances its investments, which could consist of a combination of equity debt or hybrids.  
Regarding the literature, according to Ross (2010) the “capital structure (or financial 
structure) is the specific mixture of long-term debt and equity the firm uses to finance its 
operations.”. Similarly, Brealey (2001) state in their third edition of “Fundamentals of 
Corporate Finance” that capital structure corresponds to “the firm’s mix of long-term 
financing”. 
4 
 
2.1.2 Modigliani-Miller Theorem 
 
As previously mentioned, Modigliani and Miller were the pioneers in building the 
capital structure theory. They started this discussion about the relevance of corporate 
capital structure by publishing the famous article in 1958 (Modigliani & Miller, 1958). 
In this article, the authors state that in a world with strict assumptions like no taxes 
and competitive and frictionless markets the capital structure presents no impact on the 
firm value thus becoming irrelevant. In Tarbet (2011), this Modigliani and Miller theorem 
presents strong assumptions such as that there are no taxes, there is perfect information, 
no costs of financial distress and liquidation and there are perfect and frictionless capital 
markets. Therefore, under these strong assumptions it becomes indifferent for a company 
to finance its investments with either debt or equity and the value of the company is 
completely independent of the its capital structure. This corresponds to the Preposition I 
of the theorem. In addition, the authors presented Preposition II, a derivation of 
Preposition I, which states that a firm’s cost of equity is directly related to its debt-to-
equity ratio, meaning that the higher the debt-to-equity ratio the higher will be the cost of 
equity of the company. In this second preposition, the value of the firm depends of its 
debt-to-equity ratio, of its cost of debt and of the return of its assets (Ross, 2010). 
The publishing of this theorem resulted in a major discussion right afterwards. Many 
authors criticized and published articles against the Modigliani and Miller Theorem. One 
of the first criticism came from Durand (1959) where the author mainly criticized the 
strong assumptions present in the Modigliani and Miller Theorem. According to him, 
even though Modigliani and Miller (1958) tried to achieve a “(…) operational definition 
of the cost of capital and a workable theory of investment”, they used very strong 
assumptions that were not suitable for the real world. In the real-world markets are not 
perfect nor frictionless and there are taxes and risks such as bankruptcy costs and agency 
costs. This view was shared among several other authors as well.  
Eventually, later Modigliani and Miller (1963) published another article where they 
relaxed the “no taxes assumption” and stated that the companies could profit from tax 
benefits when using debt as a way of financing. Additionally, Miller (1977) published an 
article where he argues that “(...)even in a world in which interest payments are fully 
deductible in computing corporate income taxes, the value of the firm, in equilibrium will 
still be independent of its capital structure”. Thus, for Miller (1977) the initial Modigliani 
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and Miller (1958) Theorem still applies in a world with taxes because individual and 
corporate taxes cancel each other.  
Even though it was a controversial theorem, it still provided with a path for discovery 
of the effects that influences the capital structure of a firm. 
 
2.1.3 Capital Structure Policy Models 
Considering that the assumptions of the Modigliani and Miller (1958) Theorem were 
to be relaxed, the capital structure would become very relevant for the company’s 
performance. Thus, it is important to understand what impacts the decisions of capital 
structure choice. The debate and progress on this topic of capital structure continued, after 
the Modigliani and Miller (1958) paper, and there were many studies published about the 
optimal capital structure of a company. However, as Myers (1984) argues, there were too 
many articles on optimal capital structure but none on the actual financial behavior. At 
the time, there were no articles which explained the actual decisions regarding the capital 
structure of a company. As an example, Myers (1984)1 tried to explain this financial 
behavior through an article “designed as a one-on-one competition of the static tradeoff 
and pecking-order stories”. In addition, Myers (2001) states that “There is no universal 
theory of debt-to-equity choice, and no reason to expect one. There are several useful 
conditional theories, however.” Therefore, these conditional theories like the trade-off 
theory and pecking order theory began to be tested and studied in order to explain the 
factors behind the choice of capital structure.  
Therefore, ins this section we present a summary of the definition, prediction and 
empirical evidence of both theories. These theories will either defend the existence of an 
optimal debt-to-equity ratio which firms can always adjust to (trade-off theory) or present 
arguments against the existence of a well-defined target capital structure (pecking order 
theory). 
 
                                                             
1 Meyers (1984): The author excluded the managerial theories and dropped the Miller’s neutral mutation 
hypothesis that states that “firms fall into some financing patterns(...)which have no material effect on 
firm value”.  
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2.1.3.1 Pecking Order Theory  
 
The pecking order theory presents the idea that financing sources of a company are 
chosen in a certain hierarchical order. According to Donaldson (1961) the theory defends 
that: “Management strongly favored internal generation as a source of new funds even to 
the exclusion of external funds except for occasional unavoidable 'bulges' in the need for 
funds”, meaning that firms will choose internal sources of financing over the external 
sources of financing.  
Why this preference? According to Myers and Majluf (1984) this preference for 
internal financing rather than the external financing happens due to information 
asymmetry. As stated by the author, when a company seeks external financing it faces 
two main costs: information costs and transaction costs. Given that there will be a 
separation between the ownership and the management team, the uncertainty will 
increase. Investors have the knowledge that managers possess more information and at 
any effort of seeking for external funding, the investors will eventually interpret that as a 
sign that the management team believes that the company is overvalued. Thus, they will 
lower their value for the new stocks.  
According to Myers and Majluf (1984) this is a sign that managers behave in the best 
interest of investors thus they will not issue undervalued stocks (because investors by 
believing that the company is overvalued will tend to lower the stock price and it will 
result in an undervalued stock). This corresponds to information asymmetry. Therefore, 
there is a hierarchical preference regarding financial sources starting with internal 
financing, followed by debt and then they will seek equity financing but only as a last 
resort.  In addition, transaction costs also impact the financing choice, being equity 
financing more expensive than a bank loan.  
Myers (1984), defends that the pecking order theory, motivated by the asymmetric 
information model, predicts that: “(…) the announcement of a stock issue will cause stock 
price to fall. It also predicts that stock price should not fall, other things equal, if default-
risk debt is issued.” Similarly, Myers (2001) state that firms avoid equity issues because 
it might signal that stocks are overvalued. Thus, these authors defend equally that firms 
use the pecking order theory when deciding on its capital structure. 
The empirical evidence is inconclusive. There are some studies, such as, Shyam-
Sunder and C. Myers (1999) and Frank and Goyal (2003) that support the pecking order 
theory regarding capital structure, however, some articles do not such as Helwege and 
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Liang (1996) where the authors state that “Firms that access the capital markets do not 
follow the pecking order when choosing the type of security to offer.”. 
 
2.1.3.2 Trade-off Theory  
 
The trade-off theory could be understood intuitively just by its name. Trade-off 
means, in a general way, to balance the positive and negative aspects of two opposite 
situations and then choose one over the other. Regarding the capital structure, this theory 
states that a company will decide on the mix of equity and debt based on its benefit and 
costs.  
According to Kraus and Litzenberger (1973) and Myers (1984), the debt to equity 
ratio of a company will be established based on a trade-off between “the costs and 
benefits of borrowing, holding the firm's assets and investment plans constant”. Thus, a 
company may be tempted to increase its debt levels to profit from tax savings, however 
as more debt increases the risk of the firm, the debt level should result from a trade-off 
decision between debt tax savings and bankruptcy costs. Therefore, a firm’s debt-to-
equity ratio will always be its optimal ratio. This aspect of the trade-off theory was also 
criticized by Myers (1984) because for a firm to always be at its debt-to-equity ratio it 
needs to adjust its capital structure whenever the market changes. The trade-off theory 
assumes that there are no costs of adjustments and therefore it was named as the static 
trade-off theory. However, adjusting the level of debt and equity carry transactions costs, 
and companies cannot adjust as much as the trade-off theory predicts.  
 As in the pecking order theory, the empirical evidence for the trade-off theory is also 
inconclusive.  While Trezevant (1992) and López-Gracia and Sogorb-Mira (2008) found 
empirical support for the trade-off theory, Bradley et al. (1984) provides no clear evidence 
for this support. 
 
2.2 Determinants of Capital Structure  
 
Another core element of this dissertation are the determinants of capital structure. As 
mentioned before, the debate about the relevance of capital structure started with the 
Modigliani-Miller Theorem which defined that the capital structure is irrelevant for the 
firm value. However, if those assumptions, which some of them are strongly unrealistic, 
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were relaxed then the capital structure becomes very relevant for the company. Therefore, 
academics started to focus their studies on which theories affected the decisions of capital 
structured, which were already mentioned, as well as which were the determinants that 
affected the decisions about the mix of equity and debt financing in a company. 
Thus, this section will highlight the main contributions made in literature about the 
determinants of capital structure that are of importance for this dissertation. 
Titman and Wessels (1988) were ones of the many authors that tried to explain the 
relation between leverage and some firm-specific variables such as “asset structure, non-
debt tax shields, growth, uniqueness, industry classification, size, business risk, and 
profitability.”. Using a sample of 469 United States (U.S.) firms and a factor-analytic 
model the result consisted of a negative relationship between leverage and size, 
profitability and uniqueness while rest of the variables did not present a significant impact 
on leverage.  
Additionally, Rajan and Zingales (1995) used international data of G-72 countries to 
evaluate four variables namely: tangibility, market-to-book ratio (growth opportunities), 
size and profitability, and concluded that leverage of a company is positively correlated 
with tangibility and size, but it is negatively correlated with market-to-book ratio and 
profitability.  
Unfortunately, most of the literature, regarding the determinants of capital structure, 
use either U.S. firms or listed firms. Even though, their results are important and are still 
taken into account3, the literature that used European firms or private firms as data are 
more important to guide this dissertation into applying a successful econometric model 
and achieve the desired answers. Therefore, we will now present a summary of some 
articles that were crucial for the development of this dissertation. 
Miguel and Pindado (2001) studied a sample of 133 listed Spanish firms, from 1990 
to 1997 using a two-step Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) model and concluded 
that non-debt tax shield and investment among other variables presented a significant 
impact on firm’s leverage ratio.  
In addition, Hall et al. (2004) using a large sample of 4000 unlisted firms from eight 
                                                             
2 G-7 countries corresponded to the United States, Japan, Germany, France, Italy, the United Kingdom, 
and Canada. 
3 See a summary of the methodology, variables measure and the relation of the determinants with 
leverage proven in the main literature in appendix 1, 4 and 6, respectively. 
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European countries4 from 1995 studied if the difference in capital structure of European 
SME’s5 are due to firm-specific or country specific factors. Thus, they concluded from 
the firm specific factors tangibility, growth opportunities, company size and profitability 
were the determinants that affect significantly the leverage ratio of a company.  
Similarly, Jong et al. (2008), using an extensive sample of 11845 firms  from 42 
countries worldwide englobing public and private firms, analyzed the impact of firm-
Lspecific and country-specific determinants on leverage. The results, form the firm-
specific analysis, comprised a significant and positive impact of tangibility, size and 
taxation as well as a negative impact of business risk, taxation6, growth opportunities, 
profitability and liquidity on leverage.   
Finally, Antoniou et al. (2008) also used a mixed sample of public and private firms 
from some European countries7, Japan and U.S. to study “(…)how the firms from capital 
market-oriented economies (the U.K. and U.S.) and bank-oriented economies (France, 
Germany and Japan) determine their capital structure.”.  The authors concluded that 
tangibility and company size appeared as significant and with a positive impact on 
leverage while growth opportunities and profitability presented a negative impact. The 
non-debt tax shield showed both signs while growth opportunities, business risk and 
effective tax rate were not significant.  
Therefore, basing on the existent literature and on the alternative capital structure 
theories8 the main variables mostly studied are the following: asset structure or 
tangibility, non-debt tax shields, growth opportunities, product uniqueness, company size, 
business risk, profitability, liquidity, taxes, effective tax rate and investment.  
 
2.2.1 Firm-specific Determinants of Capital Structure and Hypothesis 
Development 
 
In order to successfully include the determinants of capital structure in our empirical 
model it is necessary to understand its characteristics as well as its theoretical and 
                                                             
4 Belgium, Germany, Spain, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal and United Kingdom (U.K.).  
5 Small and medium size enterprises. 
6 The authors found both signs (negative and positive) for taxation. 
7 France, Germany, Japan and United Kingdom (U.K.). 
8 Pecking Order and Static Trade-off Theory. 
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empirically proved relation with leverage. The determinants chosen for this dissertation 
were based on the existing literature. Even though, some of the determinants were already 
tested on the European firms, others (for example liquidity) were not. At first, this could 
present a problem for the analysis, however Rajan and Zingales (1995) and Booth et al. 
(2001)  defend that the determinants of capital structure (CS) used in U.S. prevail in other 
countries. In addition, Booth et al. (2001) state that it is important to be attentive to the 
bankruptcy law, fiscal treatment and ownership concentration and accounting standards 
when using the same determinants for other countries.  
In a general, the aspects mentioned by Booth et al. (2001) do not present major 
problems for the analysis of this dissertation given that the sample is composed by 
companies form the European Union which are, law and political wise, very similar. 
While the ownership concentration becomes somewhat irrelevant because the sample 
comprises only unlisted firms and so the ownership concentration is almost the same for 
the firms of the same size, the fiscal treatment and accounting standards are the same, 
privilege of the Amadeus database. As a result, it allows the use of all the major 
determinants presented in the literature. 
 Thus, this section summarizes the relation of each variable with leverage along with 
the appropriate hypothesis for this relation based on the existing theories and empirical 
studies. 
 
Liquidity  
Regarding this variable, the trade-off theory predicts a positive relation between this 
variable and the debt ratio. While the pecking order theory predicts a negative relation 
between a firm’s liquidity and its debt ratio, because of the preference for internal 
financing over external. 
The empirical studies such as Deesomsak et al. (2004), Mazur (2007) and Jong et al. 
(2008) find a negative relation between the liquidity and leverage of a company. 
Therefore, two hypotheses arise for this variable: 
 H1a: Liquidity will be positively related to leverage. 
 H1b: Liquidity will be negatively related to leverage. 
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Investment   
Regarding the investment in fixed assets, according to the trade-off theory investment 
could present both signs. Higher investment in fixed assets means more assets to serve as 
collaterals and so it should be directly related with leverage (positive sign). On the other 
hand, a negative relation should arise between investment in fixed assets and leverage, 
due to more fixed assets equals to less asymmetric information hence issuing equity 
becomes less expensive.  
The empirical findings defend the positive sign in articles such as Booth et al. (2001), 
Miguel and Pindado (2001) and Acedo-Ramírez and Ruiz-Cabestre (2014). 
Thus, two hypotheses arise for this variable:  
 H2a: Investment will be positively related to leverage. 
 H2b: Investment will be negatively related to leverage. 
 
Business Risk  
Both theories, the trade-off theory and the pecking order theory, predict that this 
variable should present a negative relation with debt ratio. Higher business risk will 
increase the probability of company’s default and thus it will act as a obstacle in the credit 
seeking. Lenders are averse to high financial distress probability and will not provide 
borrowings to this kind of firms. Therefore, a negative relation is to be expected. 
The empirical evidence such as Miguel and Pindado (2001), Huang and Song (2006), 
Mazur (2007), Jong et al. (2008) and Psillaki and Daskalakis (2009) support this negative 
relation. However, there are several studies where this variable appears as not significant 
such as Bauer (2004), Chen (2004), Deesomsak et al. (2004) and Antoniou et al. (2008). 
Therefore, just one hypothesis arises for this variable: 
 H3: Business Risk will be negatively related to leverage. 
 
 
Non-debt tax shields  
According to the static trade-off theory this variable should present a negative relation 
with leverage. DeAngelo and Masulis (1980) state that non-debt tax shields should be 
perceived as suitable substitutes for tax benefits of credit financing and therefore, firms 
that exhibit large levels of non-debt tax shield are prone to issue less debt. However, 
Acedo-Ramírez and Ruiz-Cabestre (2014) argues that NDTS can also present a positive 
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relation with leverage because firms with high levels of this variable possess high 
proportion of tangible assets which act as a collateral providing security for the lenders.  
The empirical evidence is indeed inconclusive. Some research support the trade-off 
theory and find a negative relation between NDTS and debt ratio such as Miguel and 
Pindado (2001), Bauer (2004), Gaud et al. (2005), Huang and Song (2006) and Acedo-
Ramírez and Ruiz-Cabestre (2014). Others studies find a positive relation such as Bradley 
et al. (1984) and Delcoure (2007). Antoniou et al. (2008) finds both sings in its study 
depending on the country.  
Therefore, two hypotheses arise for this variable: 
 H4a: Non-debt tax shields will be positively related to leverage. 
 H4b: Non-debt tax shields will be negatively related to leverage. 
 
Profitability  
According to the trade-off theory, a firm’s profitability should have a positive relation 
with the debt ratio. This theory defends that higher profitability results in higher income 
to be shield form taxes and thus it should have more leverage. On the contrary, the 
pecking order theory argues that this variable should present a negative relation with the 
debt ratio because the internal financing is preferable over the external financing.  
Most empirical studies such as Titman and Wessels (1988), Booth et al. (2001), Hall 
et al. (2004), Jong et al. (2008), Antoniou et al. (2008), Frank and Goyal (2009) and 
Psillaki and Daskalakis (2009) support the negative relation between profitability and 
leverage.  
However, we will consider two hypotheses for this variable: 
 H5a: Profitability will be positively related to leverage. 
 H5b: Profitability will be negatively related to leverage. 
 
Growth opportunities  
According to the static trade-off theory, this variable should present a negative relation 
with the debt ratio. Myers (1977), states that firms that presents high growth opportunities 
are prone to adopt lower leverage because these opportunities can have a moral hazard 
effect resulting in more risk taking by the firm. On the contrary, the pecking order theory 
predicts that this variable should present a positive relation with the debt ration because 
high growth opportunities may require more funds that those that exists internally 
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therefore it may push the firm to look for external financing and thus borrow more 
leverage. 
The studies that support the negative relation between this variable and debt ratio are 
Titman and Wessels (1988), Rajan and Zingales (1995), Bauer (2004), Gaud et al. (2005), 
Jong et al. (2008) and Antoniou et al. (2008). By contrast, Booth et al. (2001), Chen 
(2004), Hall et al. (2004) and Mazur (2007) find a positive relation between leverage and 
the growth opportunities of a company.  
Thus, two hypotheses arise for this variable: 
 H6a: Growth opportunities will be positively related to leverage. 
 H6b: Growth opportunities will be negatively related to leverage. 
 
Taxes  
 This variable will be divided in two: taxation (or average tax rate) and effective tax 
rate. Regarding taxation, according to the trade-off theory more taxation equals more tax 
benefits hence an increase in leverage. Similarly, the effective tax rate should also present 
a positive relation with leverage. 
 The empirical results are inconclusive. Regarding the average tax rate, Delcoure 
(2007) and Acedo-Ramírez and Ruiz-Cabestre (2014) support the positive sign, Jong et 
al. (2008) presents both relation and Booth et al (2001) shows a negative relation with 
leverage. As for the effective tax rate, Bauer (2004) presents both sings while Anoniou et 
al. (2008) find no significant results.  
 Therefore, two hypotheses arise for this variable: 
 H7a: Taxation will be positively related to leverage 
 H7b: Effective tax rate will be positively related to leverage. 
 
Asset Structure/Tangibility  
The asset tangibility of a company, according to the trade-off theory, its predicted to 
have a positive relation with the debt ratio, given the fact that those assets can be used as 
collaterals when seeking a loan. On the other hand, according to the pecking order theory, 
this variable should present a negative relation with the debt ratio, because “more tangible 
assets will be less prone to asymmetric information problems and thus less likely to issue 
debt” (Mazur, 2007).  
14 
 
Several empirical studies support the hypothesis of a positive relation between asset 
tangibility and leverage, such as Titman and Wessels (1988), Rajan and Zingales (1995), 
Hall et al. (2004), Jong et al. (2008), Antoniou et al. (2008) and Frank and Goyal (2009). 
While others like Booth et al. (2001), Bauer (2004), Mazur (2007) and Psillaki and 
Daskalakis (2009) find a negative relation between this variable and debt.  
Thus, two hypotheses arise for this variable: 
 H8a: Asset tangibility will be positively related to leverage. 
 H8b: Asset tangibility will be negatively related to leverage. 
 
Company Size  
According to the trade-off theory, this variable should present a positive relation with 
the debt ratio. Large firms are usually more diversified with much more collateral 
guarantees which could provide better access to debt financing. However, the pecking 
order theory suggests a negative relation between leverage and this variable because large 
firms present less information asymmetry and so have easier accessibility to equity 
markets and so will present lower debt levels.  
The empirical evidence such as Rajan and Zingales (1995), Colombo (2001), Hall et 
al. (2004), Jong et al. (2008), Antoniou et al. (2008), Frank and Goyal (2009),  Psillaki 
and Daskalakis (2009) and Acedo-Ramírez and Ruiz-Cabestre (2014) support the positive 
relation while Titman and Wessels (1988), Chen (2004) and Mazur (2007) show  negative 
relation between company size and leverage. 
Thus, two hypotheses arise for this variable: 
 H9a: Company Size will be positively related to leverage. 
 H9b: Company Size will be negatively related to leverage. 
 
Product Uniqueness  
The static trade-off theory predicts that product uniqueness should present a negative 
relation with the debt ratio due to higher bankruptcy costs. Titman and Wessels (1988) 
and Bhaduri (2002) argue that if a firm has a high level of unique products it will be less 
prone in taking risks of borrowing because of the high bankruptcy costs. When facing 
liquidation these firms may enforce higher costs to their suppliers and customers due to 
the uniqueness of its product. On the contrary, the pecking order theory defend a positive 
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relation between this variable and leverage which could be due to the increase level of 
R&D expenses that could push the firms into borrowing.  
The empirical evidence such as Titman and Wessels (1988), Bhaduri (2002) and 
Mazur (2007) support the negative relation between the product uniqueness and debt 
ratio. 
Therefore, two hypotheses arise for this variable: 
 H10a: Product uniqueness will be positively related to leverage. 
 H10b: Product uniqueness will be negatively related to leverage. 
 
Although the hypothesis previously developed are important for this dissertation, they 
do not provide with the answers for the main research questions. Thus, there are two more 
hypothesis which are relevant for this dissertation but not related with the determinants 
of capital structure. These two hypotheses are related with the first and second part of the 
analysis of this dissertation. The first part aims to find if the determinants of capital 
structure that impacts the non-high-leveraged firms are the same as the ones that impact 
the high-leveraged firms and if that is done in the same proportion. Hence the following 
hypothesis arise:  
 H11: The determinants of capital structure that impact the capital structure of 
a high-leveraged and non-high-leveraged firms are the same? 
The second part of the analysis focuses on the high-leveraged subsample and aims to 
present which determinants impact the change in the leverage ratio in a leverage buyout 
operation (LBO). Hence, the following hypothesis arises:  
 H12: Which determinants of capital structure impact the choice of capital 
structure after a LBO operation? 
 With these extra hypothesis, we can answer to the research questions presented in the 
Introduction.  
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2.3 Leveraged Buyout  
 
This dissertation does not focus only on the determinants of capital structure. Another 
crucial component of this dissertation is the leveraged buyout, mostly known as the LBO, 
operation itself. The objective of this thesis, as it was highlighted in the introduction is to 
measure the impact of the determinants of capital structure change after a leveraged 
buyout operation. Therefore, it is necessary to look at the existent literature on this topic 
to better understand how this operation occurs and its characteristics.  
 
 
2.3.1 Private Equity Market 
 
This chapter will focus on explaining briefly the background of the private equity 
firms and the private equity market which will lead to a better understanding of the 
leveraged buyout operations. The private equity market refers to the collection of funds 
raised by the private equity firms with the intention to be invested in the target companies.  
 
2.3.1.1 Private Equity: Definition and main characteristics  
 
Generally, a private equity can be a firm, group of investors or a vehicle that raises 
funds (through own capital or other investor’s capital) in order to acquire potential targets 
for which they have the expertise in succeeding. The name, private equity, comes from 
the fact that these firms or vehicles are private entities strictly opposed to being publicly 
traded. Thus, when a private equity acquires 100% of the shares of a company it is 
denominated as a “going private” transaction.  
In some cases, when start-up companies seek external sources of financing, banks are 
not willing to lend due to the risks involved with investing in new businesses and so these 
companies turn to private equities. These types of investments are called venture capitals. 
In other cases, companies seek the private equities investment due to the expertise in 
business management that these companies provide to the acquired firms. Therefore, in 
the case where the acquisition of the target company is financed mainly by borrowed 
funds then this is the so called leveraged buyout operations. Thus, a private equity 
investments may include several types of investment, such as LBO, MBO, venture 
capitals or mezzanine capital. However, the most prominent in this industry are the LBO 
and the Venture Capital investments. A private equity firm’s activities can be categorized 
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into four phases: fund-raising, investment, value creation and exit phase (Heberlen, 
(2017)).  
2.3.1.2 Evolution of the Private Equity and LBO Market 
 
Due to the ambiguous definition of this type of firms/funds, the existence of private 
equity firms can be tracked back to the industrial revolution. At that time, there were 
already some companies that invested in private firms or acquired other businesses. 
However, the raise of professionally managed private equity firms was marked only in 
1946 through the establishment of the American Research and Development Corporation 
(ARDC).  
The evolution of this market was marked by the so called “the booms to bust periods”: 
from the 1980’s to the early 1990’s, from 1992 to 2002 and from 2003 to 2007. The first 
two booms to bust periods happened only in the American market while the last one also 
happened in the European market (HVCA). Even though, the first boom of LBO’s 
happened in the 80’s (because of the boom of private equities), this type of operation 
existed way before that. According to Gaughan (2015), in 1919 the Ford Motor Company 
went through an LBO operation, when Henry Ford and his son Edsel purchased the 
company’s shares for $106 million of which $75 million was borrowed. In addition, 
although this type of operation had its peak in 1980, in Europe the progress was slower 
and it only began to be noticeable in 1990, due to the creation of the Euro as well as the 
new laws appealed more for private equities to do these operations. 
Overall, the private equity and LBO market have been growing vastly in the last 
decades. The growth is not only characterized in the number of transactions but also in 
the value of the transactions. Although, the American market has been faster in this 
growth, the European private equity and LBO market has been increasing in volume as 
well. In 1980’s the European market of LBO was almost nonexistent when compared 
with the American. However, according to graph 1, from 1990 until 2008 there was a 
increase in the number of LBO’s in Europe. Now the levels are not so different to those 
of the American market. Thus, the enormous evolution of these markets emphasizes the 
need for new empirical research on this field of LBO (Acharya, 2007). 
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Figure 1. Evolution of Leverage Buyout transactions in Europe 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source : Vernimmen.com  
 
2.3.2 Leveraged Buyout Transaction 
2.3.2.1 LBO: Definition and main characteristics 
 
Brealey (2001) defines leveraged buyout (LBO) as an “acquisition of the firm by a 
private group using substantial borrowed funds”.  Therefore, this operation consists in 
private equity together with members of the management team or individual investors 
acquire target companies using majority debt to finance the acquisition. Equity, usually 
provided by the private equity fund, is also used as a source of financing but in a smaller 
amount. Furthermore, to repay those debts the private equity firm uses the target’s assets 
as collaterals for the loans used in the acquisition. Thus, the targets for a LBO operation 
are usually mature companies with stable cash flows but with either bad management or 
unfavorable opportunities for the long-term development. 
Their success come from their ability to improve the target company’s operational 
performance, debt repayment, profit from tax shields and perform right time exit (which 
could be by selling the company). According to Malenko and Malenko (2015) “Value 
creation in LBO transactions is generally attributed to two sources: operational 
improvements and the benefits of higher leverage involving tax shields and improved 
management incentives.” 
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Usually, the private equity firm plans to execute a return on the LBO within three to 
five years after the acquisition. After this, the firm engage in the exit phase. There are 
three main exit strategies used by the private equity firms. The first most common is to 
sell the target to another company, the second most common is to sell it to another private 
equity (secondary buyout) and the last exit strategy is engaging in an Initial Public 
Offering (IPO). 
 
2.3.3 Relevant literature about LBOs 
 
Even though, the number of studies and articles on capital structure relevance and its 
determinants is very extensive, there are just a few papers similar to the exact topic of this 
dissertation. More precisely, there are three articles that are very similar to this 
dissertation and the interesting part is that all papers when combined correspond to the 
first and second part of my dissertation analysis. 
Firstly, Opler and Titman (1993) investigate two hypotheses: “1) that LBOs are 
motivated by the gains from realigning incentive problems (particularly those associated 
with free cash flow), and (2) that LBOs are deterred by potential financial distress costs. 
We have operationalized these hypotheses by suggesting proxy variables for financial 
distress costs and incentive realignment potential.” The authors used a sample of 180 
firms that undertook a LBO operation from 1980 until 1990, and used a multivariate logit 
regression for the analysis. They concluded that free cash flow problems as well as the 
financial distress costs and a low Tobin’s q are the main determinants for companies to 
go through a LBO operation. They also find evidence that LBO firms are the ones with 
low R&D expenses and are more diversified than the rest of the firms. 
Secondly, Roden and Lewellen (1995) analyze the financing packages used in the 
LBO operations to test the determinants of capital structure previously studied in the 
literature. They focus on the role of agency and bankruptcy costs as well as taxes. The 
financing packages were composed by 1) senior bank debt, 2) subordinated debt 
securities, 3) preferred and common stock, 4) cash from the target firm, and 5) proceeds 
from asset sales. The authors used a sample of 107 firms that undertook a LBO operation 
during the period from 1981 until 1990 in the United States, and they used a multinomial 
logit model to analyze a set of eight hypotheses and nine determinants of capital structure. 
The authors concluded that the agency and bankruptcy costs as well as the tax 
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considerations impact the level of leveraged used in the LBO operations as well as the 
aspects of the attributes of the borrowing undertaken. The impacts are manifest in 
systematic relationships between the proportion and type of debt in the buyout financing 
package and the target firm's earnings rate, earnings variability, growth prospects, and its 
tax and liquidity position. 
Finally, Axelson et al. (2013) collected a large sample of international leverage 
buyouts from 1980 to 2008 in order to test the capital structure theories. The authors study 
the determinants of capital structure (CS) on the LBO’s and then compare it with matched 
sample of listed companies. They find that the CS of leverage buyouts is determined by 
time-series variation of debt market conditions while the CS of listed firms is determined 
by the firm-specific factors.  They conclude that what determines the CS of LBO’s is the 
price and availability of debt, “(…) hence when credit is abundant and cheap buyouts 
become more leveraged.”. Thus, this article gave answer to the same research question 
as this dissertation: Why are some LBO’s more leveraged than others?  
 Thus, these studies will serve as the main guide for the analysis of this dissertation.  
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3. METHODOLOGY 
 
3.1  Methodological aspects of similar studies 
 
As mentioned previously, the field of the determinants of capital structure lacks more 
empirical evidence in the European private firms. Most of the literature (that can be found 
in appendix 1) refer to either American companies or European but for listed companies 
(not private). In addition, most studies use either cross sectional or panel data, which will 
also be the case of this dissertation.  
Therefore, the literature review allowed to establish a proper empirical design in order 
to enable this dissertation to test the mentioned capital structure and the hypothesis 
previously developed in chapter 2.   
Regarding the methods of estimation, previous studies use several types of methods 
but the most frequent and prominent are the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) ((Bauer, 
2004), (Chen, 2004), (Deesomsak et al., 2004), (Hovakimian, Hovakimian, & Tehranian, 
2004), (Huang & Song, 2006), (Delcoure, 2007), (de Jong et al., 2008)). In this 
dissertation, other than OLS methodology, a Binary Probit Model will also be applied.  
 
3.2  Methodological aspects of this Dissertation 
 
3.2.1 Empirical Framework 
 
Panel OLS 
 
As previously mentioned this dissertation is divided in two main parts. The first part 
attempts to measure if the determinants of capital structure, impact in the same way the 
high-leveraged and non-high-leveraged companies and for that a Binary Probit model will 
be used. 
However, prior to applying the Binary Probit model, the determinants of capital 
structure will be tested in both high-leveraged and non-high-leveraged firms separately 
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using panel OLS regressions for each subsample in order to capture which determinant 
of CS impacts these types of firm. 
 
𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐿𝐼𝑄 + 𝛽2𝐼𝑁𝑉 +  𝛽3𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐾 + 𝛽4 𝑁𝐷𝑇𝑆 +  𝛽5 𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐹𝑇  
+ 𝛽6 𝐺𝑊𝑇 +  𝛽7𝑇𝐴𝑋1 + 𝛽8𝑇𝐴𝑋2 +  𝛽9𝑇𝑁𝐺 +  𝛽10𝑆𝑍1 + 𝛽11𝑆𝑍2 + 
𝛽12𝑈𝑁𝐼𝑄 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
Where the dependent variable, Yit, is the leverage ratio (LEV) modeled as a function of 
the determinants of capital structure as independent variables and εit refers to random 
disturbance or white noises.  
 
As this study focuses on private European companies, the proxy measures for the 
variables cannot include any typical variable only possible for a listed company (such as: 
market values of assets, equity or debt). Due to this, the dependent variable leverage ratio, 
contrary to the majority of previous studies ((Booth et al., 2001), (Deesomsak et al., 
2004), (Gaud et al., 2005), (González & González, 2008), (Frank & Goyal, 2009)) that 
use market values, is measured as the book value of total debt to book value of total assets. 
 
The exogenous variables are defined as: 
 
 Liquidity (LIQ): Liquidity will be measured as the ratio of current assets to 
current liabilities. 
 Investment (INV): This variable will be measured as fixed assetst minus fixed 
assetst-1 plus depreciationst. 
 Business Risk (RISK): Will be measured as the change in earnings before interest 
and taxes divided by the change in total assets. 
 Non-debt tax shields (NDTS): This variable will be measured as depreciations 
and amortizations over total assets. 
 Profitability (PROFT): Profitability will be measured with the return on assets, 
namely earnings before interest and taxes over total assets.  
 Growth Opportunities (GWT): This variable will be measured as the percentage 
change of total assets. 
(1) 
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 Tax (TAX): This variable presents two measures. TAX1 is for the taxation which 
will be measured by the average tax rate9 and TAX2 is for the effective tax rate 
measured by the ratio between earnings before taxes minus earnings after taxes) 
and earnings before taxes. 
 Asset Tangibility (TNG): Asset tangibility will be measured as the fixed assets 
over total assets.  
 Company Size (SZ): This variable will also present two measures which are the 
most used in the literature: logarithm of sales (SZ1) and logarithm of assets (SZ2). 
 Product Uniqueness (UNIQ): This variable will be measured as the research and 
development expenses over sales.  
 
When applying the OLS method the analysis will also execute some tests like the t-test 
over each parameter and F-test over R-square (or global significance) in order to obtain 
robust results.  
 
 
 
Binary Probit Model 
 
For the first part of the analysis of this dissertation we attempt to identify if the 
determinants of capital structure can predict if a firm is more prone to become high-
leveraged or non-high-leveraged, through a Binary Probit Model, where the dependent 
variable will take two values:  
 1, if the company is a non-high-leveraged company 
 0, if otherwise (high leveraged company) 
 
Therefore, the econometric model will take the following form: 
 
𝑌 =  {
1,   𝑌′′ > 0
             0, 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒
 
 
                                                             
9 For each year of the 10 years period of this sample was used the average tax rate of that specific year. 
This data was extracted from the KPMG’s Corporate tax rates table. 
(2) 
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𝑃(𝑌𝑖 = 1|𝑋) = 𝜑(𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐿𝐼𝑄 + 𝛽2𝐼𝑁𝑉 +  𝛽3𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐾 + 𝛽4 𝑁𝐷𝑇𝑆 
+ 𝛽5 𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐹𝑇 +  𝛽6𝐺𝑊𝑇 + 𝛽7𝑇𝐴𝑋1 + 𝛽8𝑇𝐴𝑋2 +  𝛽9𝑇𝐴𝑁𝐺 +  
+ 𝛽10𝑆𝑍1 +  𝛽11𝑆𝑍2 + 𝛽12𝑈𝑁𝐼𝑄 + 𝑖𝑑 + 𝑚𝑒 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡) 
 
where P=1 if the company is non-high-leveraged and P=0 if otherwise (company is high 
leveraged), idit is the control variable for industry effect and meit is the control variable 
for temporal effect. They consist of: 
 
 Industry effect dummies (id) 
The models control for the industry effect using dummy variables for each industry 
in our sample. Each dummy variable assumes the value of 1 if the company belongs to 
that specific industry and 0 if it does not. According to (Harris & Raviv, 1991)), these 
control variables are important because “firms within an industry are more similar than 
those in different industries and that industries tend to retain their leverage rankings over 
time.”. Other authors, such as Bancel and Mittoo (2004), Bauer (2004), Antoniou et al. 
(2008) and Acedo-Ramírez and Ruiz-Cabestre (2014) control for this effect.  
The Amadeus database provided for each company the NACE10 that we used to 
classify each company to the according industry by introducing each code into the 
Eurostat RAMON website. This gave us a total of 21 industry classification. We then 
group these 21 industries in just 5 global groups11.  
 
 Temporal effect dummies (me) 
Additionally, time fixed-effects were also controlled in both econometric models. This 
allows us to control the incidence of macroeconomic effects on the capital structure. Once 
again, these control variables are dummies variables that assume the value of 1 for a 
certain year and 0 for the rest. This will help analyze the data on the same year for all the 
                                                             
10 NACE is the abbreviation for the Statistical Classification of economic activities in the European 
Community. 
11 More information about these five global groups is available in Appendix 2 
(3) 
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companies and see if there are some macroeconomic effects on the capital structure 
Acedo-Ramírez and Ruiz-Cabestre (2014). 
 
 
Ordinary Least Squares Model  
 
In the second part of the study, we focused only on the high-leveraged 
subsample12 and attempt to analyze the effect of the determinants of capital structure on 
the leverage buyout transaction. In order to do that we use the Ordinary Least Squares13 
as the estimation method of the following model.  
 
𝑌𝑖 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 ∗ 𝐷 + 𝛽2𝐿𝐼𝑄 + 𝛽3𝐿𝐼𝑄 ∗ 𝐷 + 𝛽4𝐼𝑁𝑉 +  𝛽5𝐼𝑁𝑉 ∗ 𝐷 
+ 𝛽6𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐾 + 𝛽7𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐾 ∗ 𝐷 + 𝛽8𝑁𝐷𝑇𝑆 + 𝛽9𝑁𝐷𝑇𝑆 ∗ 𝐷 + 𝛽10𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐹𝑇 
+𝛽11𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐹𝑇 ∗ 𝐷 + 𝛽12𝐺𝑊𝑇 + 𝛽13𝐺𝑊𝑇 ∗ 𝐷 + 𝛽14𝑇𝐴𝑋1 + 𝛽15𝑇𝐴𝑋1 
∗ 𝐷 + 𝛽16𝑇𝐴𝑋2 + 𝛽17𝑇𝐴𝑋2 ∗ 𝐷 + 𝛽18𝑇𝑁𝐺 + 𝛽19𝑇𝑁𝐺 ∗ 𝐷 + 𝛽20𝑆𝑍1 
+𝛽21𝑆𝑍1 ∗ 𝐷 + 𝛽22𝑆𝑍2 + 𝛽23𝑆𝑍2 ∗ 𝐷 + 𝛽24𝑈𝑁𝐼𝑄 + 𝛽25𝑈𝑁𝐼𝑄 ∗ 𝐷 
+𝑖𝑑 + 𝑚𝑒 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
 
 
Other than the variables in the previous model, this model also includes a dummy 
variable, Dit, which indicates if the observations are from a period before or after the LBO 
transaction in order to show how the determinants of capital structure impact the change 
of CS in a LBO operation. The variable takes the value of 1 if observation is from a period 
after the LBO, and 0 before.  
 
 
                                                             
12 In this part only the high-leveraged subsample is used, from which all firms that do not present data for 
the year before, during and after the LBO are excluded.  
13 This methodology is still not defined. There is a possibility of using the GMM model instead of the OLS. 
(4) 
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4. DATA COLLECTION 
 
4.1 Collection of Data, Databases and sample 
 
 
This dissertation focuses on European Union (28 countries) private companies for the 
period from 2006 to 2016. Firstly, the subsample of high-leveraged companies, i.e., 
companies that were acquired by a private equity in the period of 2007-2016, was 
extracted from the Zephyr database through a set of requirements and filters which can 
be consulted in the Appendix 3.  
This process resulted in 303 leverage buyout deals from which were eliminated the 
deals whose targets were either financial firms14 and firms that no longer existed or had 
no data available in the Amadeus database. The final high-leveraged subsample consisted 
of 127 European private firms. 
Then, in order to create a control group, a second subsample of all Europe Union non-
financial companies that were not acquired by a private company in the period of 2006-
2016 was collected. This subsample was extracted from the Amadeus data base using 
similar requirements and filters as the first subsample (Appendix 3).  
This process, created a subsample of 4390 firms. These firms were used to select 127 
non-high-leveraged firms as similar as possible to the high-leveraged subsample, through 
the matching process. The matching process consisted in using the return on assets15 and 
the total asset16 as the matching characteristics for choosing a company from the 4,390 
sample similar to the one from the high-leveraged subsample. Thus, for each company 
from the first subsample (high-leveraged) another was chosen from the 4390 sample (non-
high-leveraged) that had a very similar ROA and total assets. Therefore, this second 
subsample resulted in 127 European non-high-leveraged private firms. Axelson et al. 
(2013) used the same matching technique to achieve a sample of non-high-leveraged 
listed firms similar to the leverage buyout sample. Although they used different matching 
characteristics17, the authors were able to use the similar samples for comparison analysis.   
                                                             
14 Since financial firms present different structure for the balance sheets when comparing with the non-
financial firms, thus it was necessary to exclude them in order to achieve robust results.  
15 ROA was computed as ROA=EBIT/TA. 
16 Total assets +/- 5%. 
17 According to Axelson et al. (2013) “…we take as a matching characteristic the median industry value 
among the public companies in the Global Compustat database in the same year, region (North America, 
Western Europe, Eastern Europe, Asia, or Australia), and Fama-French industry (using their 49-industry 
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The type of data used is cross-sectional and panel data and according to Delcoure 
(2007), the use of panel data provides additional degrees of freedom.  
 
4.2  DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
 
This section will present some relevant descriptive statistics of the high-leveraged and 
non-high-leveraged companies, separately.  
Table 1 exhibits the descriptive statistics for the high-leveraged subsample. The mean 
leverage ratio, is 36.2% and there is not much difference from the mean to median 
(32.5%).  
 
Table 1.  Descriptive statistics for the High-Leveraged subsample 
 
Variables Unit Mean Median Std. 
Deviation 
Observations 
Total Assets  (€) 749,725.3 504,810.9 735514 1035 
Sales  (€) 362,277.6 247,031.4 414,694.3 870 
Leverage 
(BVTD/BVTA)  
(%) 
36.2 32.5 31.1 990 
Liquidity (CA/CL)  (%) 3,089.3 118.2 57,939.1 1,031 
Investment ((FAt-FAt-
1+D&A)/TA)  
(%) 
0.8 2.3 33.8 804 
Risk (ΔEBIT/TA)  (%) -3,540.3 105.7 73,375.6 71 
Non-debt Tax Shields 
(D&A/TA)  
(%) 
4.2 2.9 7.0 925 
Profitability (ROA)  (%) 3.2 2.9 16.8 1,032 
Taxes1 (average tax 
rate) 
(%) 
28.2 29.6 4.8 1,270 
Taxes2 ((EBT-
EAT)/EBT)  
(%) 
74.5 9.8 1,946.2 979 
Tangibility (FA/TA)  (%) 58.5 62.9 29.3 1,035 
Size1 (ln(S)) (€) 5.2 5.4 0.7 838 
Size2 (ln(TA)) (€) 5.7 5.7 0.4 1,035 
Product Uniqueness 
(R&D/S)  
(%) 
14.5 0.0 393.9 714 
Source: own creation 
 
  
Table 2, presents the descriptive statistics for the non-high-leveraged subsample. As 
expected the leverage ratio is lower than for the high-leveraged subsample, with a mean 
(median) equal to 23.8% (11.5%). As it can be seen the leverage ratio of the non-high-
                                                             
classification) as the LBO”.  
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leveraged firms is lower by a mean (median) of 12.4% (21%) which is expected given 
that the high-leveraged firms are more leveraged.  
 
 
Table 2. Descriptive statistics for the Non-High-Leveraged subsample 
 
 Variables  Unit Mean Median Std. 
Deviation 
Observations 
Total Assets  (€) 821,421.4 499,417.7 958,156.6 1280 
Sales  (€) 767,275.4 384,862.6 656,151.8 1248 
Leverage (BVTD/BVTA) (%) 23.8 11.5 29.1 1,219 
Liquidity (CA/CL)  (%) 223.4 113.9 835.8 1,270 
Investment ((FAt – FAt-
1+D&A)/TA)  
(%) 
-994.1 1.1 33,200.8 1,183 
Risk (ΔEBIT/TA)  (%) 2,155.4 83.9 262,800.7 1,220 
Non-debt Tax Shields 
(D&A/TA)  
(%) 
3.2 2.6 3.8 1,192 
Profitability (ROA)  (%) 4.4 3.7 11.4 1,268 
Taxes1 (average tax rate) (%) 27.6 28.0 5.4 1,270 
Taxes2 ((EBT-EAT) / EBT)  (%) 28.2 19.7 337.2 1,239 
Tangibility (FA/TA)  (%) 51.0 49.6 31.6 1,270 
Size1 (ln(S)) (€) 5.5 5.6 0.8 1,234 
Size2 (ln(TA)) (€) 5.7 5.7 0.4 1,270 
Product Uniqueness 
(R&D/S)  
(%) 
-115.8 0 3,979.0 1,229 
Source: own creation 
 
In general, there is no significant difference between the total assets of the high-
leveraged and the non-high-leveraged. Which was expected given that this was the criteria 
used in the matching process to choose the control group. However, this could also 
suggest that firms, which are a target of a LBO transaction, tend to present higher assets 
values due to the use of these same assets as collaterals to repay for the financing packets 
used in the acquisition. The sales section presents a bigger difference between the two 
subsamples. This could happen due to the difference in missing values for this account 
(high-leveraged firm present more missing data). Additionally, firms that go through a 
LBO transaction can present lower sale power hence lower sale volume than those that 
were not in this type of operation. There are also some apparent differences in the means 
and medians of the dependent and independent variables between the two subsamples. 
Therefore, a difference in the results of the econometric analysis between the two 
subsamples is expected. 
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5. RESULTS 
 
5.1  Panel OLS  
 
Prior to execute the panel OLS and given the fact that there is a large number of 
variables the possibility for multicollinearity arises. The presence of multicollinearity is 
not favorable because as Bauer (2004) states multicollinearity could result in “large 
standard errors of the estimated regression coefficients and leads to instability of 
regression estimates”.  
To avoid the multicollinearity and given the existence of some obstacles with the 
multicollinearity test models18 two classic approaches were implemented. Firstly, all 
variables that comprised absolute values (from the balance sheet) as their measure should 
be tested separately. Since absolute values from the balance sheet, like total assets and 
sales, would be highly correlated with the size of the company (higher companies would 
present higher sales and assets) joining them all in the same model would could bring 
multicollinearity problems, thus the necessity to test them separately. Thus, the two 
measures of company size will be tested separately due to the presence of absolute values 
of assets and sales. The second approach consists in building the correlation matrix and 
highlight which variables present high correlation between and then built restricted 
models with and without those variables. Following Bauer (2004), correlation equal and 
higher than 0.5 are considered to entail multicollinearity problems. 
Therefore, the correlation matrix was computed to verify which measures had high 
correlation between them. Appendix 6 and 7 presents the correlations between the various 
measure for the subsamples and samples used in all models of the econometric analysis. 
In the subsample of high-leveraged firms only one value is equal to 0.5 which corresponds 
to correlation between investment and growth opportunities. While, in the subsample of 
non-high-leveraged firms three values appear equal of higher than 0.5, namely the 
correlation between investment and non-debt tax shields and profitability and the 
correlation between the first measure of company size (SZ1) and tangibility. For the other 
samples used in the Binary Probit model and second OLS there were no high correlation. 
Taking this into account, the panel OLS is applied to the high-leveraged subsample 
                                                             
18 The Eviews 9 software does not provide with the tools to test for multicollinearity when using panel data. 
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and Table 3 shows the results.  In order to know which model to use19 the Hausman test 
was applied. As it can be seen in the table all five models present a statistically significant 
Hausman test, meaning that the fixed effect is preferable for this data, hence the panel 
OLS fixed effects was applied. The table presents five models, where (1) represents the 
overall (unrestricted) model which comprises all dependent variables and could present 
the multicollinearity problem20, (2), (3), (4) and (5) represent the models with and without 
the variables with the high correlation mentioned previously21 (restricted models) as well 
as the presence of absolute values between the two measures for company size. 
As for the results, the independent variable non-debt tax shields   is statistically 
significant and shows a positive relation with debt ratio which is consistent with the 
hypothesis H4a that defends that leverage increase as the non-debt tax shields increase. 
This finding is supported by the literature such as Delcoure (2007) and Antoniou et al. 
(2008). Taxation appears statistically significant and positive which supports the 
hypothesis H7a which states that the higher the average tax rate of a firm the higher will 
be its leverage ratio. Delcoure (2007) and Acedo-Ramírez and Ruiz-Cabestre (2014) also 
present the same conclusions regarding this determinant of capital structure. The 
determinant asset tangibility is also significant and presents a positive relation with 
leverage consistent with the hypothesis H8a that defends that firms with higher assets 
volumes will present a higher leverage ratio. The findings of Hall et al. (2004), 
Deesomsak et al. (2004)22 and Jong et al. (2008) also support this relation.  Company size 
also appears positive and statistically significant which is supported by the hypothesis 
H9a meaning that larger firms will exhibit larger leverage ratio. Rajan and Zingales 
(1995), Bauer (2004), Gaud et al. (2005), Jong et al. (2008), Frank and Goyal (2009), 
Psillaki and Daskalakis (2009) and Acedo-Ramírez and Rui-Cabestre (2014) found the 
same relation in their studies. The interesting fact is that the natural log of assets (SZ2) 
appears significant in all models (where this variable is included), while the natural log 
of sales (SZ1) is significant only in the absence of SZ2.  
                                                             
19 Pooled OLS, fixed effect or random effect. 
20 Even though the multicollinearity problem could be present in this model (1), it was computed specially 
to compare with the restricted models and see if the multicollinearity problem indeed was present in this 
data.   
21 Investments and growth opportunities. See appendix 7. 
22 The author finds positive relation between tangibility and leverage but not significant in all countries of 
the sample.  
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Table 3. Panel Ordinary Least Squares regression for the High-leveraged subsample 
 
 
This table presents the results from the panel data OLS regression regarding the determinants that 
impact the capital structure of the high-leveraged firms. Model (1) comprises all determinants of capital 
structure, while (2) and (3), each one, relaxes one of those independent variables that presented a high 
correlation in table 3, in order to avoid multicollinearity. Model (4) and (5) test the difference between the 
measures for company size (SZ). This table gives the coefficients and the standard error (in parentheses) 
for each variable. In addition, it presents the Hausman and F-statistic test as well as the number of 
observations that each model uses. The *, **, and *** indicates if the results given by the model are 
statistically significant for the level of significance of 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
 
Variables Unit (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Liquidity (CA/CL)  (%) 0.001 
(0.070) 
0.001 
(0.071) 
0.000 
(0.071) 
0.004 
(0.070) 
-0.003 
(0.070) 
Investment ((FAt – FAt-
1+D&A)/TA) 
(%) - 2.755 
(3.643) 
 0.642 
(3.210) 
 - 1.705 
(3.242) 
Risk (ΔEBIT/TA)  (%) -0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.002 
(0.001) 
-0.002 
(0.001) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
Non-debt Tax Shields 
(D&A/TA)  
(%)     68.871*** 
(11.700) 
    63.397*** 
(11.148) 
    62.441*** 
(11.590) 
    66.307*** 
(11.051) 
    68.049*** 
(11.529) 
Profitability (ROA)  (%) 0.287 
(4.762) 
0.823 
(4.782) 
0.973 
(4.800) 
0.623 
(4.738) 
0.458 
(4.749) 
Growth opp. (% Δ of 
TA) 
(%) 0.014 
(0.021) 
0.025 
(0.018) 
 0.007 
(0.019) 
 
Taxes1 (Average tax 
rate) 
(%)      0.017 *** 
(0.003) 
    0.014 *** 
(0.003) 
      0.014*** 
(0.003) 
  0.017*** 
(0.003) 
    0.017*** 
(0.003) 
Taxes2 ((EBT-EAT) / 
EBT)  
(%) - 0.069 
(0.327) 
- 0.089 
(0.329) 
- 0.084 
(0.330) 
- 0.075 
(0.326) 
- 0.066 
(0.327) 
Tangibility (FA/TA)  (%)     15.665** 
(6.180) 
      16.54** 
(6.073) 
    16.526** 
(6.200) 
    14.643** 
(6.040) 
   15.217** 
(6.140) 
Size1 (ln(S)) (€) 0.007 
(0.027) 
    0.048* 
(0.025) 
      0.053** 
(0.024) 
  
Size2 (ln(TA)) (€)     0.147** 
(0.046) 
        0.151*** 
(0.041) 
      0.160*** 
(0.039) 
Product Uniqueness 
(R&D/S)  
(%) - 0.879 
(1.186) 
- 0.861 
(1.183) 
- 0.660 
(1.194) 
- 1.011 
(1.173) 
- 0.844 
(1.182) 
Intercept  -    1.146*** 
(0.274) 
- 0.442** 
(0.166) 
-     0.469** 
(0.167) 
- 1.117*** 
(0.271) 
 
-    1.183*** 
(0.264) 
F-statistic      21.44***    21.40***   21.31***   21.88***   21.89*** 
Hausman  19.62* 18.63** 18.97** 19.43** 19.80** 
N  655 655 655 655 655 
Source: own computation 
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Overall, all five models present the same statistically significant variables suggesting 
that the results are robust. Additionally, the global significance presented by the F-statistic 
test is statistically significant to all three levels of confidence which adds to the robustness 
of the results. Now, regarding the multicollinearity problem, even when using restricted 
models the results maintain the same except for one of the company size measures (SZ1) 
which only appears significant in the restricted models, meaning that there was 
multicollinearity problem only between this two company size measures. 
Table 4 presents the result of the panel OLS regression applied to the non-high-
leveraged subsample. The Hausman test was applied again which provided with the same 
significant result in all models except in (2) and (3) for which even though the Hausman 
test suggested the random effect model, the fixed effect was applied in order to be 
consistent with the previous results. Thus, the panel OLS fixed effects was applied.  
This table presents five models, where (1) represents the overall model which 
comprises all independent variables and also could present the multicollinearity 
problem23 while, as in the high-leveraged subsample, models (2), (3), (4) and (5) represent 
the models with and without the variables with the high correlation mentioned 
previously24 (restricted models) as well as the presence of absolute values between the 
two measures for company size. 
Regarding the results, in this subsample the independent variable liquidity is 
statistically significant and shows a negative relation with debt ratio in all models which 
is consistent with the hypothesis H1b which defends that firms with higher liquidity will 
show lower leverage ratio. The literature such as Deesomsak et al. (2004) and Mazur 
(2007) supports our findings. Investment appears statistically significant and positive 
which supports the hypothesis H2a meaning that firms with higher levels of investment 
in fixed assets will show higher leverage ratios. This is also supported by the findings of 
Acedo-Ramírez and Ruiz-Cabestre (2014) and Miguel and Pindado (2001). In addition, 
the independent variable non-debt tax shields appear statistically significant and with a 
negative sign which is consistent with hypothesis H4b which states that if firms present 
high non-debt tax shields it will present lower leveraged ratio. The findings of Bauer 
                                                             
23 For the same reason, as in the high-leveraged subsample: even though the multicollinearity problem could 
be present in this model (1), it was computed specially to compare with the restricted models and see if the 
multicollinearity problem indeed was present in this data.   
24 Investments, non-debt tax shields and profitability. See appendix 7. 
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(2004), Deesomsak et al. (2004) and Huang and Song (2006) support this idea. The 
independent variable profitability appears statistically significant and negative only in 
unrestricted model (1) which shows the problem of multicollinearity. This result is 
consistent with hypothesis H5b which suggests that firms with higher profitability will 
exhibit lower debt ratio. Gaud et al. (2005) and Psillaki and Daskalakis (2009) support 
our findings. Company size, similarly with the previous subsample results, the natural log 
of assets appears negative and statistically significant in all models while natural log of 
sales is statistically significant in one of the restricted models. This is consistent with the 
hypothesis H9b meaning that larger firms present lower leverage ratio. Our findings are 
consistent with those of Titman and Wessels (1988) and Chen (2004). Finally, product 
uniqueness appears statistically significant and positive which supports the hypothesis 
H10a which defends that firms with more unique products will show higher leverage 
ratios. This is consistent with the results presented by Mazur (2007). The global 
significance presented by the F-statistic test is statistically significant to all three levels 
of confidence which adds to the robustness of the results. Overall, all five models present 
the same statistically significant variables with the exception of the non-debt tax shields 
and the company size (SZ1) which only become statistically significant in the restricted 
models, meaning that the multicollinearity problem is evident in this sample. 
When comparing the results of the two subsamples the differences are evident. There 
is difference in the number of observations, the observations are superior in the non-high-
leveraged subsample. Additionally, there is difference in the significance of the 
determinants of capital structure. The non-high-leveraged firms exhibits more statistically 
significant determinants than the high-leveraged firms. Additionally, there are only two 
determinants in common   between the high-leveraged and the control group meanly non 
-debt tax shields and company size, but with different signs. Which means even though 
there are some determinants in common they present different signs thus there is no 
determinant that impacts in the same way the high-leverage and non-high-leveraged 
firms.  Therefore, our results do not support the hypothesis H11, namely the determinants 
of capital structure that impact the capital structure of a high-leveraged and non-high-
leveraged firms are the same? .
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Table 4. Panel Ordinary Least Squares regression for the Non-High-leveraged 
subsample 
 
This table presents the results from the panel data OLS regression regarding the determinants that 
impact the capital structure of the non-high-leveraged firms. Model (1) comprises all determinants of capital 
structure, while model (2) and (3) test the difference between the measures for company size (SZ). This 
table gives the coefficients and the standard error (in parentheses) for each variable. In addition, it presents 
the Hausman and F-statistic test as well as the number of observations that each model uses. The *, **, and 
*** indicates if the results given by the model are statistically significant for the level of significance of 
10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
Variables Unit (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 
Liquidity (CA/CL)  (%) -    0.148 ** 
(0.062) 
-   0.169** 
(0.060) 
- 0.165** 
(0.058) 
-   0.150** 
(0.06) 
-   0.141** 
(0.061) 
Investment ((FAt – FAt-
1+D&A)/TA) 
(%)       0.012*** 
(0.003) 
      0.007*** 
(0.001) 
       0.008*** 
(0.001) 
Risk (ΔEBIT/TA)  (%) 0.000 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
Non-debt Tax Shields 
(D&A/TA)  
(%) - 9.644 
(34.400) 
- 100.113*** 
(20.631) 
 -123.250*** 
(22.071) 
 
Profitability (ROA)  (%) -   11.443** 
(5.434) 
- 5.947 
(5.361) 
 - 5.466 
(5.311) 
 
Growth opp. (% Δ of 
TA)  
(%)  0.001 
(0.001) 
0.000 
(0.001) 
0.000 
(0.001) 
0.000 
(0.001) 
0.000 
(0.001) 
Taxes1 (Average tax 
rate) 
(%) -0.001 
(0.002) 
0.000 
(0.002) 
- 0.000 
(0.002) 
- 0.001 
(0.002) 
- 0.001 
(0.002) 
Taxes2 ((EBT-EAT) / 
EBT)  
(%) - 0.101 
(0.106) 
- 0.082 
(0.108) 
- 0.085 
(0.106) 
- 0.089 
(0.107) 
- 0.088 
(0.106) 
Tangibility (FA/TA)  (%) - 7.675 
(5.037) 
  - 2.444 
(4.927) 
1.934 
(4.336) 
Size1 (ln(S)) (%) 0.000 
(0.022) 
-   0.037** 
(0.016) 
- 0.031 
(0.019) 
  
Size2 (ln(TA)) (%) -  0.103** 
(0.035) 
  -     0.081*** 
(0.024) 
-   0.059** 
(0.027) 
Product Uniqueness 
(R&D/S)  
(%)       0.061*** 
(0.009) 
      0.061*** 
(0.009) 
      0.060*** 
(0.009) 
      0.062*** 
(0.009) 
      0.061*** 
(0.009) 
Intercept        0.898***                       
(0.197) 
0.469*** 
(0.103) 
      0.402*** 
(0.118) 
      0.773*** 
(0.155) 
      0.574*** 
(0.171) 
F-statistic     37.76***       38.69***       38.95***       38.73***      38.46*** 
Hausman    24.93** 11.43 11.35      20.26**    20.20** 
N  1082 1101 1095 1102 1097 
Source: own computation  
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5.2  Binary Probit Model 
 
The Probit model measures probabilities, and in the case of this dissertation it will 
give the probability of a company being either high-leveraged or non-high-leveraged 
according to some determinants of capital structure. In other words, it permits to see if 
the determinants of capital structure can predict if a firm is more prone to become high-
leveraged or non-high-leveraged. The dependent variable is binary so it assumes the value 
of 1 if the company if non-high-leveraged and 0 if it is high-leveraged.  
Table 5 presents the result of the estimation of the Probit model. Model (1) and (4)25 
are the restricted models only for the two company size measures given that there are no 
other high correlations. Then model (2), (3) refers to the model (1) with the addition of 
the control variables of the industry effects and temporal effects. This is equal to models 
(5) and (6) which refer to model (4) with the control variables added. 
Regarding the results, the probabilities estimated in table 5 show that these 
determinants that appear statistically significant can predict more if a company will 
become a target of a LBO transaction than if it will not26. Thus, the determinants 
investment, non-debt tax shields, taxation and tangibility appear statistically significant 
with a positive sign which means that the higher the value of this determinants the higher 
will be the leverage ratio of the firm. Now, regarding the direct impact presented by the 
investment (in fixed assets) as well as tangibility and non-debt tax shields, it was expected 
given that usually the LBO targets are mature firms which present higher assets that are 
then used as collaterals for the debt used in the transaction (tangibility and investment). 
Additionally, these firms present higher non-debt tax shields due to their larger and 
mature activity allowing to obtain other tax shields other than those that come from debt. 
As for the taxation, this result is unexpected given that usually firms with high average 
tax rate would not be so suitable as targets for LBO transactions due to the costs in debt 
seeking, thus it should be presenting a negative sing and not otherwise. 
Profitability and growth opportunities appear with a negative sing. These results 
suggest that firms with high profitability and growth opportunities will have a low 
                                                             
25 Note that the when combined the two subsamples into one, the sample does not present any correlation 
above 0.5, therefore there is not a possibility for multicollinearity regarding the correlation but only 
regarding the absolute values of the company size measure. See appendix 5. 
26 Table 5 presents a low probability for a company being non-high-leveraged firms thus it presents a high 
probability for a company being a high-leveraged firm. Therefore, the determinants that appear statistically 
significant impact more the high-leveraged firms than the control group. 
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probability of becoming a non-high-leveraged and a high probability of becoming a high-
leveraged firm. A firm with high profitability levels are less prone to be part of a LBO 
transaction. This is explained by the pecking order theory where high profitability means 
lower levels of debt ratio and thus lower probability of being in a LBO transaction due to 
the preference for internal financing over the external. Therefore, companies with higher 
profitability leads to a decrease in leverage due to the preference of internal financing 
over external and thus are less prone to be target of a LBO transaction. Regarding growth 
opportunities they suggest that firms that possess high growth opportunities are less prone 
of being part of a LBO transaction. One of the characteristics of a typical LBO target is 
the maturity of the company. Thus, a steady firm with steady cash flows also means not 
so many growth opportunities (Fundamentalfinance.com). Therefore, this result presence 
a real logic regarding the LBO target characteristics. 
Except for non-debt tax shields and the first measure of company size (SZ1)
27, none 
of these variables are statistically significant in all models. When applying the control 
variable industry effects, in model (2) and (5) there is no significant change in the 
significance of the variables. However, when controlling for temporal effects, in model 
(3) and (6), there are some changes. Investment and growth opportunities become not 
statistically significant and the same happens to profitability when the company size is 
measured by the natural log of sales.  
Thus, the determinants that actually28 could determine which company is more or less 
prone to be in a leveraged buyout operation are the non-debt tax shields, taxation, 
tangibility and profitability29. 
 
 
                                                             
27 Note that the natural log of sales is statistically significant in all models that included this variable, which 
does not include all six models but only three.  
28 Even when adding the control variable industry effects and macroeconomic or temporal effects.  
29 Only in the model with the natural log of assets as the company size measure. 
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Table 5. Binary Probit Model 
 
This table presents the results from the Binary Probit model which aims to prove if the same determinants impact the capital structure of the high-leveraged and non-high-leveraged firms in 
the same way. Model (1) and (4) test the different measures of company size (SZ1 and SZ2) to avoid multicollinearity. Model (2) and (3), as well as (5) and (6) are the same (1) and (4) models with 
the addition of the control variables. This table gives the coefficients and the standard error (in parentheses) for each variable. In addition, it presents the LR-statistic test as well as the number of 
observations that each model uses. The models test for industry effect (idit) and for the temporal effect (meit) The *, **, and *** indicates if the results given by the model are statistically significant 
for the level of significance of 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
Variables Unit (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Liquidity (CA/CL) (%) - 0.158 
  (0.425) 
-  0.151 
(0.436) 
-  0.391 
(0.496) 
0.137 
(0.388) 
0.168 
(0.392) 
- 0.010 
(0.433) 
Investment ((FAt – FAt-1+D&A)/TA)  (%)      28.163* 
 (14.601) 
  27.904* 
(14.945) 
23.027 
(18.017) 
   25.703* 
(14.122) 
  24.811* 
(14.221) 
18.968 
(17.582) 
Risk (ΔEBIT/TA) (%) 0.002 
(0.003) 
0.002 
(0.003) 
0.002 
(0.003) 
0.002 
(0.003) 
0.002 
(0.003) 
0.002 
(0.003) 
Non-debt Tax Shields (D&A/TA)  (%)      155.643** 
(65.654) 
    166.068** 
(67.057) 
    174.738** 
(68.749) 
  117.636* 
(64.466) 
   119.709* 
(66.165) 
 126.459* 
(68.033) 
Profitability (ROA)  (%) -  58.809* 
(30.604) 
-  57.374* 
(31.521) 
- 29.046 
(31.245) 
-    78.494** 
(30.953) 
-    80.211** 
(32.165) 
- 52.653* 
(31.626) 
Growth opp. (% Δ of TA) (%) -   0.158* 
(0.081) 
-   0.160* 
(0.084) 
-   0.009 
(0.033) 
-     0.176** 
(0.081) 
-      0.170** 
(0.083) 
-  0.010 
(0.038) 
Taxes1 (Average tax rate) (%)      0,016** 
(0,007) 
 0,009 
(0,007) 
     0,018** 
(0,008) 
      0,019** 
(0,007) 
     0,013* 
(0,007) 
   0,021* 
(0,008) 
Taxes2 ((EBT-EAT) / EBT)  (%) -  4.703* 
(2.471) 
- 4.533* 
(2.494) 
-  5.024* 
(2.747) 
-   4.491* 
(2.478) 
-  4.254* 
(2.482) 
-   4.741* 
(2.730) 
Tangibility (FA/TA)  (%)   5.364 
(13.203) 
 16.255 
(13.622) 
19.974 
(14.195) 
    25.134** 
(11.564) 
    39.124** 
(12.268) 
       44.509*** 
(12.787) 
Size1 (ln(S)) (€) -       0.191*** 
(0.057) 
-      0,244*** 
(0,059) 
-      0,256*** 
(0,062) 
   
Size2 (ln(TA)) (€)    0,148 
(0,100) 
0,098 
(0,103) 
0,078 
(0,108) 
Product Uniqueness (R&D/S)  (%) 0.158 
(1.123) 
0.201 
(1.080) 
0.855 
(1.178) 
0.047 
(1.205) 
0.050 
(1.176) 
0.698 
(1.333) 
Industry Fixed Effects    Included Included  Included Included 
Temporal effect    Included   Included 
Intercept  - 0.235 
(0.418) 
- 0,643 
(0,460) 
- 1,848*** 
(0,529) 
-2,272*** 
(0,628) 
-     2,697*** 
(0,655) 
-       3,877*** 
(0,722) 
LR statistic       57.09***       107.36*** 247.81***      47.63***      90.48***        231.53*** 
P(Y=1|X)  0.00 0.00 0.006 0.00 0.00 0.009 
N  1767 1767 1767 1768 1768 1768 
Source: own computation  
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5.3  Ordinary Least Squares Model 
 
This corresponds to the second part of the analysis previously mentioned. In this 
analysis, the OLS regression will be applied only to the high-leveraged subsample. 
However, it is not the same subsample used in the previous regression (table 3), this 
subsample excludes all firms that present no data for the year before, during and after a 
leverage buyout operation. Those firms are excluded given that in this part it is important 
to understand the determinants that contribute more to the change in leverage during a 
leverage buyout operation. Therefore, to measure that change, a dummy variable, D, is 
added to the equation 1 resulting in equation 4 (the control variables are also added). This 
dummy assumes the value of 0 the years before the LBO and the value of 1 in the years 
during and after the LBO operation. By adding this dummy variable, those determinants 
that appear statistically significant, with the dummy it will reflect the additional impact 
on the change of capital structure. 
Table 6 presents the results of the OLS application. Note that, all the six models used 
in this regression are equal to the ones used in the Binary Probit model. Liquidity is the 
first one to appear statistically significant in all models. Thus, the coefficient of 
Liquidity*D represents the additional impact on the change of CS. In summary, not only 
this determinants impact positively leverage ratio, which means higher the liquidity 
higher the leverage levels, but also it impacts directly the change of Capital Structure 
during a LBO operation. The independent variable investment appears statistically 
significant and the signs of both variables are different (positive for investment and 
negative for investment*D). Thus, higher the liquidity higher the leverage ratio and lower 
the increase of leverage after the leverage buyout operation. Profitability appears 
statistically significant and once again both variables show different signs (negative for 
profitability and positive for profitability*D) leading to this conclusion: higher the 
profitability of a company, lower the leverage level and higher will be leverage ratio after 
the LBO transaction (although it presents a negative relation with debt ratio it shows a 
positive impact on the leverage level during the LBO operation). The determinant 
taxation presents the same results as the investment where it has both signs in the result 
(positive for taxation and negative for taxation*D) leading to the conclusion of higher the 
average tax rate, higher will be the leverage ratio and lower will be its impact after the 
LBO operation. This suggests that when the average tax rate is high firms will tend to 
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seek more external debt to obtain tax shields, and after the LBO the need for more 
leverage is mitigated. Regarding tangibility, this variable suggests that higher the assets 
tangibility of a target of LBO higher will be the leverage ratio of that company due to the 
collateral value of the assets and lower will be the impact of this variable on leverage after 
the LBO operation. This suggests that after a LBO transaction, all assets are used as 
collaterals for the financing repayment leading to a low amount of existing assets in that 
target and thus it will lower the level of leverage after that operation. Company size (only 
the natural log of sales measure) exhibits different signs for both variable (negative for 
size and positive for size*D). Thus, larger the firm, lower will be the leverage ratio and 
higher will be the impact of the company dimension on leverage after the LBO operation. 
The large dimension of a company can allow accessibility to external funding.  
Finally, as for product uniqueness it suggests that if a company has more unique 
product it will decrease its leverage ratio because it is not willing to incur in a lot of risk, 
however after being in the LBO transaction a firm these unique product increase leverage 
which could be due to the need for research and development.  These results give answer 
to the hypothesis 12 on which are the determinants that impact the capitals structure 
choice after a LBO operation. When introducing the dummy variables that control for 
industry effect it impacts the statistically significance of the non-debt tax shields (which 
now become not statistically significant) and when controlling for the temporal effect the 
variable affected is investment (actually investment*D). 
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Table 6.  Ordinary Least Squares  
 
This table presents the results from the Ordinary Least Squares regression model which aims to prove if the which determinants impact the capital structure change and why 
some LBO’s are more leveraged than others. Model (1) comprises all determinants of capital structure, while (4) tests the difference between the measures for company size 
(SZ). Model (2) and (3), as well as (5) and (6) are the same (1) and (4) models with the addition of the control variables. This table gives the coefficients and the standard error 
(in parentheses) for each variable. In addition, it presents the F-statistic test as well as the number of observations that each model uses. The models test for industry effect (idit) 
and for the temporal effect (meit) In addition, the model includes a dummy variable, Dit, to capture the change in the capital structure done by the determinants of capital structure. 
The results were computed with the Huber-White covariance method which give robust results against heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation.   The *, **, and *** indicates if 
the results given by the model are statistically significant for the level of significance of 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
Variables Unit (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Liquidity (CA/CL)  (%)        0.271*** 
(0.033) 
        0.267*** 
(0.036) 
      0.280*** 
(0.044) 
        0.264*** 
(0.039) 
        0.254*** 
(0.041) 
        0.268*** 
(0.049) 
Liquidity *D ((CA/CL)*D) (%) 0.017 
(0.566) 
0.011 
(0.565) 
0.017 
(0.562) 
0.220 
(0.599) 
 0.148 
(0.588) 
0.150 
(0.585) 
Investment ((FAt – FAt-1+D&A)/TA)  (%)    20.106* 
(11.042) 
   17.345* 
(10.160) 
   17.631* 
(10.508) 
15.939 
(11.594) 
13.442 
(10.668) 
13.568 
(10.951) 
Investment * D (((FAt – FAt-1+D&A)/TA)*D)  (%) -   29.355** 
(13.001) 
-    24.816** 
(12.164) 
-22.124 
(13.477) 
-  24.831* 
(13.421) 
-  20.684* 
(12.505) 
-17.056 
(13.848) 
Risk (ΔEBIT/TA)  (%) 0.003 
(0.002) 
0.002 
(0.003) 
0.002 
(0.002) 
0.003 
(0.002) 
0.002 
(0.002) 
0.002 
(0.003) 
Risk*D ((ΔEBIT/TA)*D)  (%) -0.004 
(0.003) 
-0.003 
(0.003) 
-0.003 
(0.003) 
-0.005 
(0.003) 
-0.004 
(0.003) 
-0.004 
(0.003) 
Non-debt Tax Shields (D&A/TA)  (%) - 7.155 
(29.823) 
10.320 
(29.368) 
9.664 
(30.082) 
-12.293 
(30.437) 
      6.573* 
(30.253) 
5.796 
(30.740) 
Non-debt Tax Shields*D ((D&A/TA)*D)  (%)     122.521** 
(59.110) 
96.079 
(59.805) 
92.723 
(60.732) 
      120.195** 
(55.505) 
102.536 
(56.774) 
   100.008* 
(57.388) 
Profitability (ROA)  (%) -    57.308** 
(20.751) 
-   43.717** 
(21.266) 
-42.838* 
(21.974) 
-      64.503** 
(21.831) 
-     49.707** 
(22.161) 
-     49.393** 
(22.601) 
Profitability*D (ROA*D)  (%)      54.936** 
(21.386) 
     43.501** 
(21.772) 
  41.763* 
(22.410) 
       60.615** 
(22.936) 
      49.076** 
(22.835) 
      47.743** 
(23.254) 
Growth opp. (% Δ of TA) (%) 0.001 
(0.041) 
0.002 
(0.043) 
-0.004 
(0.044) 
-0.008 
(0.043) 
-0.007 
(0.046) 
-0.010 
(0.046) 
Growth opp.*D (% Δ of TA*D) (%) 0.124 
(0.086) 
0.127 
(0.088) 
0.112 
(0.091) 
0.134 
(0.089) 
0.135 
(0.091) 
0.117 
(0.093) 
Taxes1 (Average tax rate) (%)      0.007** 
(0.003) 
     0.007** 
(0.003) 
    0.008** 
(0.004) 
0.005 
(0.003) 
0.004 
(0.003) 
0.005 
(0.004) 
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Taxes1*D (Average tax rate*D) (%) -    0.011** 
(0.004) 
-   0.010** 
(0.004) 
-   0.010** 
(0.005) 
-0.006 
(0.004) 
-0.005 
(0.004) 
-0.004 
(0.005) 
Taxes2 ((EBT-EAT) / EBT)  (%) -0.138 
(1.437) 
0.003 
(1.358) 
0.044 
(1.353) 
-0.379 
(1.365) 
-0.178 
(1.320) 
-0.213 
(1.322) 
Taxes2*D (((EBT-EAT) / EBT)*D)  (%) -0.081 
(1.463) 
-0.260 
(1.385) 
-0.225 
(1.381) 
0.205 
(1.395) 
-0.072 
(1.351) 
-0.060 
(1.356) 
Tangibility (FA/TA)  (%)       35.738*** 
(7.048) 
       36.391*** 
(8.068) 
      36.761*** 
(8.335) 
       38.894*** 
(7.516) 
       38.903*** 
(7.918) 
       39.003*** 
(8.278) 
Tangibility*D (FA/TA)  (%) -8.097 
(9.088) 
-10.444 
(9.161) 
-10.732 
(9.534) 
-7.192 
(10.386) 
-9.872 
(10.442) 
-9.854 
(10.823) 
Size1 (ln(S)) (€) -   0.073** 
(0.029) 
-    0.063** 
(0.031) 
-   0,063** 
(0,031) 
   
Size1 *D (ln(S)*D) (€)   0.041* 
(0.025) 
  0.044* 
(0.024) 
   0,044* 
(0,025) 
   
Size2 (ln(TA)) (€)    0.007 
(0.048) 
0,003 
(0,049) 
0.006 
(0.050) 
Size2 *D (ln(TA)*D) (€)    0.012 
(0.027) 
0,012 
(0,026) 
0.008 
(0.027) 
Product Uniqueness (R&D/S)  (%) - 4.787* 
(2.700) 
-  5.448** 
(2.557) 
-   5.211** 
(2.588) 
-  4.666* 
(2.813) 
-     5.386** 
(2.648) 
-    5.133* 
(2.673) 
Product Uniqueness*D ((R&D/S)*D)  (%) 1.198 
(2.754) 
2.417 
(2.628) 
1.982 
(2.724) 
1.044 
(2.870) 
2.373 
(2.720) 
1.903 
(2.806) 
Industry fixed effects   Included Included  Included Included 
Temporal effect    Included   Included 
Intercept      0.358** 
(0.159) 
0.237 
(0.200) 
0.348 
(0.217) 
-0.003 
(0.272) 
-0.034 
(0.2) 
0.105 
(0.304) 
 
F-statistic        5.69***       5.26***       3.90***       5.34***       5.02***       3.73*** 
N  448 448 448 448 448 448 
Source: own computation   
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5.4 Discussion 
 
In this section, we will present a discussion about the main results of the econometric 
models and other authors findings.  
Firstly, we will discuss about the first panel ordinary least squares computed for both 
subsample separately. The difference between the results of the high-leveraged and the 
non-high-leveraged subsamples entail answers to two of the research questions. The 
determinants that impact positively the leverage ratio are the non-debt tax shields, the 
taxation, asset tangibility and company size. This means the higher these determinants 
the higher will be the leverage ratio. According to Acedo-Ramírez and Ruiz-Cabestre 
(2004), a positive impact of the non-debt tax shields on leverage suggests that firms with 
high levels of this determinant has a high proportion of tangible assets that can be used 
as collaterals thus increasing the leverage accessibility and levels. Bradley et al. (1984) 
also states that this determinant acts as “securability” of assets. The positive impact of the 
taxation in the leverage ratio is directly related to the tax benefits that can come from 
borrowing more. Delcoure (2007) and Acedo-Ramírez and Ruiz-Cabestre (2004) defend 
this idea that higher average tax rate will increase the leverage level due to the necessity 
for tax benefits that come from borrowing. The asset tangibility also presents a positive 
impact on the leverage ratio, meaning that a firm with high asset tangibility will tend to 
present higher leverage levels due to the fact that assets count as collaterals for borrowing 
(Hall et al. (2004), Jong et al. (2008), Antoniou et al. (2008) and Frank and Goyal (2009)). 
Finally, as for the company size, it suggests that larger the company higher will be 
leverage ratio. The trade-off theory and authors like Hall et al. (2004), Antoniou et al 
(2008) and Psillaki and Daskalakis (2009) suggest that larger firms are more diversified 
and possess more collaterals giving more accessibility to leverage. 
Which gives the answer to the research question “Why are some LBO’s more 
leveraged than others?”. These determinants are the ones that explain why some leverage 
buyout target companies become more leveraged than the others. It must do with the non-
debt tax shields of the target company, as well as the taxation impact, the amount of asset 
tangibility that the target company possesses and its size, meaning that larger targets tend 
to be more leveraged than the other LBO’s targets. In addition, the positive impact of 
these determinants on leverage is proved by many authors such as Rajan and Zingales 
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(1995), Hall et al. (2004), Bauer (2004), Gaud et al. (2005), Delcoure (2007), Antoniou 
et al. (2008), Jong et al. (2008) and Acedo-Ramírez and Ruiz-Cabestre (2014).  
Regarding the results of the non-high-leveraged subsample it presents different 
statistically significant variables. The major difference between the two models is that 
this one showed new statistically significant variables as well as the same variables as the 
other subsample but with a different sign. The determinants investment and product 
uniqueness presented a positive relation with debt ration while the liquidity, non-debt tax 
shields, profitability and company size presented a negative relation with the debt ratio. 
The positive sign of investment in fixed assets on the leverage level is due to the fact that 
more fixed assets means more collaterals to be used when borrowing (Booth et al. (2001), 
Miguel and Pindado (2001), Acedo-Ramírez and Ruiz-Cabestre (2014)). Regarding the 
product uniqueness, this determinant of capital structure presented a positive relation with 
leverage meaning that higher the number of unique products higher will be the leverage 
ratio. This could be explained by the fact that unique products may require more 
innovation hence the necessity for capital and the increase in leverage level. Liquidity, 
shows an indirect impact on leverage ratio, meaning higher the liquidity lower the 
leverage. This result could be supported by pecking order theory. Thus, the result of 
higher liquidity equals to higher leverage ratio. Non-debt tax shields also exhibit a 
negative relation with debt ratio. According to DeAngelo and Masulis (1980), the authors 
state that non-debt tax shields should be perceived as suitable substitutes for tax benefits 
of credit financing and therefore, firms that exhibit large levels of non-debt tax shield are 
prone to issue less debt. As for profitability, it shows a negative sign consistent with the 
pecking order theory that defends that the internal financing is preferable over the external 
one thus firms choose to use firm’s profitability rather than borrowing (Titman and 
Wessels (1988), Booth et al. (2001), Hall et al. (2004), Jong et al. (2008), Antoniou et al. 
(2008)). 
These results were consistent with the literature, namely with article like Titman and 
Wessels (1998), Miguel and Pindado (2001), Bauer (2004), Deesomsak et al. (2004), 
Huang and Song (2006) and Psillaki and Daskalakis (2009).  
These difference between the high-leveraged and non-high-leveraged firms could be 
explained either by the nature of their capital structure or by the amount in observations. 
Either way, both subsample’s models were globally statistically significant and controlled 
for multicollinearity which delivered robust results. In addition, the difference in the 
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determinants of capital structure answered the second question “What are the 
determinants of capital structure for high-leveraged and non-high-leveraged companies 
in Europe Union and how they impact the capital structure of such companies?”   
 Secondly, regarding the Binary Probit model in general the determinants that impact 
positively the probability of a company being non-high-leveraged are the investment, non-
debt tax shields, taxation and asset tangibility. A negative impact presents the 
determinants such as profitability and the growth opportunities of a company. The result 
shows a very low probability of the company continuing to be a non-high-leveraged firm 
and a very high probability of a company becoming target of a LBO operation when those 
determinants with same sign and impact (coefficient) are present. The sign difference 
could be explained by the determinant’s characteristics, and it is also related with the 
findings from the previous panel OLS results. For example, the larger the asset tangibility 
of a company the higher the probability of a company becoming a target of a LBO because 
the assets can be used as collaterals.  
Finally, the second Ordinary Least Squares model applied presented with some results 
regarding the question “What are the determinants of the capital structure change after 
the LBO operation?” This model comprised a dummy variable multiplied to the 
independent variables that gave the impact of a LBO on the leverage level of the 
company. The determinants of capital structure that showed a statistically significant 
impact on the leverage ratio are liquidity, investment, non-debt-tax shields, profitability, 
taxation, asset tangibility, company size and product uniqueness. However, in some cases 
the determinant and the LBO impact (determinant*Dummy) showed different signs. For 
example, profitability showed a negative impact on leverage ratio while profitability*D 
showed a positive impact on leverage suggesting more profitable companies tend to 
increase more leverage the LBO transaction, than less profitable companies. The contrary 
happens with investment, it shows a positive impact on leverage ratio, meaning higher 
investment in fixed assets will be taken as a collateral insurance hence the higher leverage. 
However, after the LBO transaction, this determinant impacts negatively the leverage 
level which means that higher the investment in fixed assets, lower the leverage increase. 
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6. CONCLUSION 
 
The theme of this dissertation consisted of two major topics: the determinants of 
capital structure and the leverage buyout, a not as discussed topic but with some valid 
empirical evidence. Combining these two topics gave result to something unique. Firstly, 
because even in the so highly discussed field of determinants of capital structure there is 
lack of empirical evidence regarding the private European firms. Secondly, when joining 
the two topics together there are even fewer authors publishing in this field. Finally, there 
is no paper with these two topics together, that studies private European LBO’s targets 
from 2006 to 2016 and with a matching subsample of private companies.  
This dissertation aimed to provide answers to some research questions. The first one 
was “What are the determinants of capital structure for high-leveraged and non-high-
leveraged companies in Europe Union and how they impact the capital structure of such 
companies?”. Our results show that determinants of capital structure like non-debt tax 
shields, average tax rate, asset tangibility and company size impact the capital structure 
of the high-leveraged firms. The non-high-leveraged firm are affected by investment, 
product uniqueness, liquidity, non-debt tax shields, profitability and size. Our results also 
provide with some insights about “What are the determinants of the capital structure 
change after the LBO operation?” The estimations state that determinants like liquidity, 
investment, average tax rate, and tangibility have a positive impact on the leverage ratio, 
in general, but after the LBO they decrease the leverage ratio. On the contrary, 
determinants like profitability, size and product uniqueness create a negative impact in 
leverage in the general form but after the LBO they help increase the leverage level.  The 
final research question was “Why are some LBO target companies more leveraged than 
others?”. When comparing the panel OLS of the high-leveraged subsample and the Binary 
Probit model que can conclude that the determinants that really impact the level of 
leverage are non-debt tax shields, average tax rate, tangibility, profitability and company 
size.  Regarding future research, there are some directions that could be developed form 
this dissertation’s framework. The first one is to use a dynamic model, such as system 
GMM, for this analysis. The second, is to test for differences between country specific 
and firm specific determinants for the LBO’s. Finally, the third consists in testing the 
difference between bank-oriented and market oriented economies when dealing with 
LBO’s.  
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8. APPENDIXES 
 
Appendix 1. Summary of the methodology of the main studies 
Studies Methodology Type of 
data 
Sample size Location/ 
type of 
companies 
Data 
Source/Base 
Time 
(Acedo-
Ramirez & 
Ruiz-
Cabestre, 
2014) 
Two stage GMM Panel 
Data 
888 
companies 
France, 
Germany, 
Itali, Spain 
and UK / 
PUBLIC 
companies 
 
Worldscope  
 
1998-
2008 
(Antoniou et 
al., 2008) 
System GMM Panel 
Data 
4,854 (total 
of 4 
countries)  
 
France, 
Germany, 
Japan and 
UK / all non 
financial 
firms 
 
Datastream, 
SDC platinum, 
La Porta, Lopez-
de-Silanes, 
Shleifer, and 
Vishny (1997),  
(1998).  
1987-
2000 
(Bancel & 
Mittoo, 2004) 
Survey + univariate 
and multivariate 
regression and Probit 
Cross-
sectional 
data 
720 firms 16 European 
countries 
the French 
financial journal 
La Tribun and 
Bloomerang 
database 
2000-
2002 
 
(Bauer, 2004) OLS Cross-
sectional 
data 
74 firms Czech 
Republic 
listed firms 
Prague Stock 
Exchange 
website +  
Centre of the 
Czech Republic 
data base 
2000-
2001 
(Bhaduri, 
2002) 
Two stage model: 
1st) Partial 
adjustment model 
2nd)  Factor Analytic 
technique  
Cross-
sectional 
data 
363 firms India Centre 
for Monitoring 
Indian Economy 
(CMIE) 
database 
1990-
1995 
(Chang, Lee, 
& Lee, 2009) 
MIMIC  model Cross-
sectional 
data 
13 887 
firm-year 
observations 
in 16 years 
 Annual 
Compustat 
Industrial Files 
1988-
2003 
(Chen, 2004) pooled OLS, fixed 
effects, and random 
effects 
Firm-
level 
Panel 
Data 
88 companies China – 
listed 
companies 
Dow–China 88 
Index +  U.S. 
GAAP 
1995-
2000 
(Colombo, 
2001) 
Tobit model Cross-
sectional 
and Panel 
data 
1100 Hungary Hungarian 
Ministry of 
Finance + 
Hungarian 
Central 
Statistical Office 
1992-
1996 
(Črnigoj & 
Mramor, 
2009) 
Multiple regression Cross-
sectional 
data 
3 214 in 1999 
to 4,280 in 
2006 
Slovenian 
public and 
private firms 
 
Agency of the 
Republic of 
Slovenia 
for Public Legal 
Records and 
Related Services 
(AJPES). 
 
1999-
2006 
(de Jong et al., 
2008) 
Firm level OLS Cross-
sectional 
11 845 firms 42 countries 
worldwide 
(developed 
COMPUSTAT 
Global database 
+ World 
1997-
2001 
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and Panel 
data 
and 
developing) 
Private + 
public firms 
Development 
Indicators and 
Financial 
Structure 
Database of 
the World Bank 
(de Miguel & 
Pindado, 
2001) 
GMM Panel 
Data 
133  firms Spain 
Listed 
companies 
CNMV (Spanish 
Security 
Exchange 
Commission) 
1990-
1997 
(Deesomsak 
et al., 2004) 
OLS Cross-
sectional 
and Panel 
data 
294 Thai, 
669 
Malaysian, 
345 
Singaporean, 
and 219 
Australian 
firms 
Thailand, 
Malaysia, 
Singapore 
and Australia 
All non 
financial 
listed firms 
Datastream 1993-
2001 
(Delcoure, 
2007) 
pooled OLS, fixed 
effect, and random 
effects 
Panel 
Data 
22 Czech, 61 
Polish, 33 
Russian, and 
13 
Slovak 
-Czech 
Republic, 
Poland, 
Russia and 
Slovak 
Republic 
-Publicly 
traded 
companies 
Thomson 
Financial's 
Worldscope 
database 
1996-
2002 
(Frank & 
Goyal, 2009) 
FACTOR 
ANALYSIS 
Cross-
sectional 
data 
270 000 
firm-year 
observations 
US – 
publicly 
traded 
Center for 
Research in 
Security Prices 
(CRSP) database 
1950-
2003 
(Gaud et al., 
2005) 
Arellano and Bond 
(1991) two-step 
GMM 
Panel 
data  
104 firms Switzerland 
Listed firms 
Worldscope 
Swiss Stock 
Guide 
1991-
2000 
(González & 
González, 
2008) 
GMM Panel 
data 
12 049 firms 39 countires Worldscope 1995-
2004 
(Graham C. 
Hall, 
Hutchinson, & 
Michaelas, 
2004) 
Regression analysis Cross-
sectional 
data 
 
 
4000 (500 
from each 
country) 
Belgium, 
Germany, 
Spain, 
Ireland, 
Italy, 
Netherlands, 
Portugal and 
the 
UK 
Dun and 
Bradstreet 
 
 
1995 
(Hovakimian 
et al., 2004) 
OLS  1689 firms  Compustat 
Industrial, Full 
Coverage, and 
Research files 
1982-
2000 
(Huang & 
Song, 2006) 
OLS  1200 Chinese 
listed firms 
 1994-
2003 
(Mazur, 2007) Multiple regression 
model 
 238 (13 
industires) 
Polish listed 
firms 
Notoria Serwis 2000-
2004 
(Psillaki & 
Daskalakis, 
2009) 
Period 
SUR (Seemingly 
Unrelated 
Regression) and 
Pooled 
EGLS (Estimated 
Generalized Least 
Squares). 
Panel 
data 
320 Italian,  
52 
Portuguese,  
1,252 Greek 
and  2006 
French 
SMES 
Greek, 
French, 
Italian, and 
Portuguese 
SME’s 
Amadeus 
database 
1997-
2002 
(Booth et al., 
2001) 
Fixed effects 
regression 
Cross-
sectional 
and Panel 
data 
5281 10 developed 
countires 
with listed 
firms  
the International 
Finance Corpo- 
ration (IFC 
1980-
1990 
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(Titman & 
Wessels, 
1988) 
LISREL system: 
factor- analytic 
model consisting of 
two parts: a 
measurement model 
and a structural 
model that are 
estimated 
simultaneously  
 
Cross-
sectional 
Data  
 
469 US Annual 
Compustat 
Industrial Files 
and Department 
of Labor, 
Bureau of Labor 
Statistics, 
"Employment 
and Earnings"  
 
1974-
1982 
(Rajan & 
Zingales, 
1995) 
Regression: 
Maximum 
Likelihood and 
censored Tobin 
Model 
Panel 
data 
30% - 70% 
of the 
companies 
listed in 
every country 
 
- G-7 
countries 
(US, Japan, 
Germany, 
France, Italy, 
Uk and 
Canada) 
-Listed non-
financial 
companies 
 
Global Vantage 
 
 
 
(Opler & 
Titman, 1993) 
Multivariate Logit 
Regression 
Cross-
sectional 
Data 
180 -US 
-Firms that 
undertook a 
LBO 
operation 
NBER 
Manufacturing 
Firm Panel 
And ADP M 
&A Database 
 
(Roden & 
Lewellen, 
1995) 
Multinomial Logit 
Model 
Panel 
data 
107 US 
-Firms that 
undertook a 
LBO 
operation 
Annual lists 
published in 
Mergers and 
Acquisitions and 
COMPUSTAT 
 
Source: own creation 
 
Appendix 2. Industry classification 
NACE VER. 2 (the sample 
only comprises 16 from 21 
industries) 
Joining the industry 
classification 
Five global groups 
A – Agriculture, forestry and 
fishing L + M + N + Q + R = 72 
firms  
ID1 
B – Mining and quarrying 
C – Manufacturing  
D – Electricity, Gas, Steam 
and Air conditioning supply 
D + E = 17 firms ID2 
E – Water supply, Sewerage, 
Waste management and 
Remediation activities 
F – Construction 
G – Wholesale and retail 
trade; Repair of motor 
vehicles and motorcycles G + H = 51 firms ID3 
H – Transportation and 
Storage 
I – Accommodation and Food 
service activities 
C + F = 72 firms ID4 
J – Information and 
Communication 
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K – Financial and Insurance 
activities 
L – Real Estate activities 
Others = A + B + I + J + K ID5 
M – Professional, Scientific 
and Technical activities 
N – Administrative and 
Support Service activities 
Q – Human Health and Social 
Work activities 
R – Arts, Entertainment and 
Recreation 
Source: own creation +   Eurostat 
 
Appendix 3. Data sample filters 
Filters for the Zephyr and 
Amadeus database 
High-leveraged Non-high-leveraged 
1º Unlisted targets Unlisted companies 
2º Deal type: Institutional 
Buyout 
Latest years of accounts: 
2016 
3º Current Deal status:  
Completed and confirmed 
Category: very large 
companies 
4º Time period: 1/01/2006 – 
1/12/2016 
Nº of years with accountings: 
10 years 
5º World region: European 
Union enlarged (28) 
World region: European 
Union enlarged (28) 
6º Target’s financials: Total 
Assets = 250,000 EUR 
Firm’s financials: Total 
Assets = 250,000 EUR 
7º  Status: Active 
Source: own creation +  Amadeus and  Zephyr database 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
55 
 
Appendix 4. Measures of the determinants of capital structure in the literature 
Studies LEV TNG NDTS GWO UNIQ SZ RISK PROFT LIQ TAX INV 
(Acedo-
Ramirez & 
Ruiz-
Cabestre, 
2014) 
Dit = Total 
debtit/Total 
assetit 
n.a NDTSit = 
Depreciationi
t 
n.a. n.a. Sit = Ln Sit    
Log of sales  
n.a. n.a. n.a. EFECTIVE 
TR : ETRit = 
Taxes 
paidit/Earning
s before 
taxesit 
Iit = NFAit _ 
NFAit_1 + 
Depreciationi
t 
(Booth et 
al., 2001) 
Total 
liabilities/(Total 
liabilities+net 
worth) 
Or 
LT D/(TA- BV 
Eq+MV Eq) 
 
(TA – Current 
A)/TA 
 R&D 
Market to book 
ratio 
 Natural log 
of Sales 
SD of ROA ROA=(NOI/TA
) 
 EFECTIVE 
TR : ETRit = 
Taxes 
paidit/Earning
s before 
taxesit 
 
(Frank & 
Goyal, 
2009) 
1) TD/MV 
TA 
2) TD/BV 
TA 
3) LT 
D/MV 
TA 
4) LTD/ BV 
TA 
Tangibility or 
R&D/Sales or 
Uniqueness 
dummy 
NDTSit = 
Depreciationi
t 
Market-to-book 
ratio or 
Change in log 
of assets 
Or Capex/TA 
 Log of 
Assets 
n.a. Profitability n.a. Variance of 
stock returns 
n.a. 
(Huang & 
Song, 
2006) 
 FA/TA D&A/TA Market-to-book 
ratio of eq 
 Sit = Ln Sit    
Log of sales 
Or Log of 
TA  
SD(EBIT/TA) EBIT/TA  Average tax 
rate 
 
(Antoniou 
et al., 2008) 
BV Total Debt/ 
BV total Assets 
Net Tangible 
assets/ BV TA 
D&A/TA n.a. (uses 
market values) 
n.a Natural Log 
os Total 
Annual 
Sales/Asset
s 
First difference 
of annual 
earnings (% 
change) minus 
average of the 
first differences 
Operating 
profit/ BV Total 
Assets 
n.a EFFECTIVE 
TR: Total 
tax/total 
taxable 
income 
n.a. 
(Bauer, 
2004) TL= Book Total 
Liabilities Ratio = 
Toatl Liabilities/ 
(Total Liabilities + 
Tang A/TA D&A/TA P/B ratio n.a Natural Log 
of S/TA 
Standard 
deviation of 
ROA 
ROA(EBIT/TA) n.a (Earnings 
before taxes-
earnings  after 
taxes)/earning
s before taxes 
n.a 
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Book Value of 
Equity) 
TD = Book Total 
Debt Ratio = Total 
Debt/ (Total Debt 
+ Book Value 
Equity)  
 
-  
(Chang et 
al., 2009)  
(Inventory+gros
s plant and 
equipment)/TA 
NDT/TA or 
DEP/TA oe 
Investment 
tax credit/TA 
n.a. R&D/SALE
S 
n.a. SD of % Change 
of Operating 
Income or 
coefficient of 
variation of 
ROA or ROE 
Or coefficient of 
variation of 
OI/TA 
Operating 
Income/ TA or 
OI/Sales 
n.a. n.a. n.a. 
(Chen, 
2004) 
BV TD/BV TA  
and 
BV Long Term 
Debt /TA 
 
Tangible 
Assets/TA 
D&A/TA Sales 
growth/TA 
growth 
n.a. Log of TA First difference 
of % change of 
OI 
EBITDA/TA n.a. n.a. n.a. 
(Colombo, 
2001) 
net trade credit 
position 
(payables± 
receivables) to 
total assets. 
Fixed Assets/TA 
and 
Inventories/TA 
n.a. Investments/T
A 
n.a. Log of Net 
sales and 
Level of 
employmen
t 
n.a. After tax 
profits/TA 
n.a. n.a. n.a. 
(de Jong et 
al., 2008) 
BV Long term 
debt/( BV TA-BV 
Eq + MV Eq) 
Net FA/BV TA n.a. MV TA/BV 
TA 
n.a. Natural log 
of Total 
Sales 
SD of OI/BV 
TA 
OI/BV TA Total 
Current 
Assets/ T. 
Curren 
Liabilities 
Taxation: 
Average tax 
Rate of the 
Year from 
Compustat 
EFECTIVE 
TR : ETRit = 
Taxes 
paidit/Earning
s before 
taxesit 
n.a. 
(Deesomsa
k et al., 
2004) 
TD/(TD+MV 
Eq+BV 
Preference 
shares) 
T FA/TA D&A/TA (BV TA – BV 
Eq + MV Eq)/ 
BV TA 
n.a. Natural Log 
Assets 
Annual % 
change in EBIT 
and the average 
of EBIT over 
the sample 
period 
EBIT/TA Current A/ 
Current 
Liabilities 
n.a. n.a. 
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(Delcoure, 
2007) 
TD/TA 
Long Term 
Debt/TA 
Short term 
Debt/TA 
Net PPI/TA Dep/TA ratio of the 
geometric 
average of 
5years' sales 
growth to total 
assets growth 
n.a. (ln(TA)) SD of first 
difference of 
(EBIT/TA) 
ROA = 
(NOI/TA) 
n.a. Average tax 
rate 
n.a. 
(Rajan & 
Zingales, 
1995) 
Total 
Liabilities/total 
Assets (NOT 
GOOD) 
(Short term+long 
term Debt)/TA 
Tangible 
Assets/TA 
 R&D/Sales  Natural log 
of sales 
EBIT/Interest 
expenses or 
EBITDA/interes
t expenses 
ROA = 
(NOI/TA) 
   
(Titman & 
Wessels, 
1988) 
TD/TA 
Long Term 
Debt/TA 
Short term 
Debt/TA 
 
Intangible 
asstest/TA and  
(Inventory + 
gross plant and 
equipment)/TA 
 
Investment 
Tax 
Credit/TA 
And 
D/TA 
NDT/TA 
Capex/TA 
% change of 
TA 
R&D/S 
R&D/SALE
S 
CS/S 
Qui rate 
 
Natural log 
of sales 
And qui 
rate 
SD of % change 
in OI 
OI/S 
OI/TA 
   
(Ozkan, 
2001) 
     Natural log 
of sales 
 EBITDA/Ta    
(de Miguel 
& Pindado, 
2001) 
  Ebit -interest 
payable - 
(Taxes paid/t) 
       Iit = NFAit _ 
NFAit_1 + 
Depreciationi
t 
(Gaud et 
al., 2005) 
BV TD/BV TA´ 
Market cap of Eq 
(Tangible assets 
+ 
inventories)/TA 
 Market to book 
value of Assets 
 Natural log 
of sales 
 EBITDA/Ta    
(González 
& 
González, 
2008) 
Lt debt/(TA – BV 
Eq + MV Eq) 
% of Property, 
lant and 
equipment 
(PPE) 
 Market-to-book 
ratio 
 Natural log 
of sales 
 EBITDA/Ta    
(Graham C. 
Hall et al., 
2004) 
Short term D/TA 
Long T D/TA 
FA/TA  % change in 
sales turnover 
in the previous 
3 years 
 TA  EBIT/SALES 
Turnover 
   
(Mazur, 
2007) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BV TOTAL 
LIABILITIES/B
V TA 
FA/TA D/TA % change of 
TA  
% change of 
Net Revenue 
Sales 
Long term 
investment/TA 
Cost of 
Sales/Net 
revenues 
from sales 
Net revenue 
from Sales 
or TA 
SD of % change 
of OI 
OI/NET 
REVENUES 
FROM SALES 
Current 
assets/Shor
t term 
liabilities 
EFFECTIVE 
TR: Income 
tax/ gross 
profit 
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(Psillaki & 
Daskalakis, 
2009) 
Total 
Liabilities/total 
Assets 
Tangible 
Assets/TA 
 Annual change 
of earnings 
 Log of 
Sales 
the squared 
deviation of 
each year’s 
earnings before 
taxes from the 
period average 
EBIT/TA    
(Bancel & 
Mittoo, 
2004) 
   P/B ratio  Natural Log 
of Mkt Cap 
     
Source: own creation 
Appendix 5.  The relation between the variables and leverage reported in the literature 
Studies TNG NDTS GWO UNIQ SZ (often weak 
resulst) 
RISK PROFT LIQ TAX  INV AGC 
(Acedo-Ramirez & Ruiz-
Cabestre, 2014) 
 Negative and 
significant 
  positive and 
significant 
   Taxation: positive 
and significant  
significant 
and positive 
 
(Booth et al., 2001) negative  positive  Negative/positive  negative  Negative significant 
and positive 
 
(de Miguel & Pindado, 2001)  negative        significant 
and positive 
 
(Rajan & Zingales, 1995) positive  negative  Positive  NEGATIVE     
(Frank & Goyal, 2009) positive n.a. n.a. n.a. positive n.a. negative n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
(Antoniou et al., 2008) positive Negative and 
positive 
(depends on 
country)  
negative  positive Not 
significant 
negative  Effective tax rate: 
Not significant 
  
(Flannery & Rangan, 2006) positive  negative  positive       
(Huang & Song, 2006) Positive 
and not 
significant 
in other 
models 
negative negative  positive negative negative     
(Titman & Wessels, 1988) Not 
significant 
 
Not significant 
Not significant negative negative  
Not 
significant 
negative     
Bradley et al (1984)   positive    negative      
(Bauer, 2004) negative negative negative  positive Not 
significant 
negative  Positive and 
negative 
  
(Chen, 2004) positive Not significant positive  Negative (for long 
term debt) 
Not 
significant 
negative     
(Colombo, 2001) positive    Positive       
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(Deesomsak et al., 2004) Positive 
but not 
significant 
in all 
countries 
negative negative  positive Not 
significant 
Negative but 
not significant 
in all countries 
negative    
(Delcoure, 2007) positive positive   positive Negative 
inconclusive 
negative  positive   
(Gaud et al., 2005) positive  negative  positive  negative     
(González & González, 2008) Positive 
but not 
significant 
 Negative but not 
significant(González 
& González, 2008) 
 positive  negative     
(Graham C. Hall et al., 2004) positive  positive  positive  negative     
(Mazur, 2007) negative Negative 
(insignificant??) 
positive positive negative negative negative negative positive   
(Psillaki & Daskalakis, 2009) negative  Not significant  positive negative negative     
(de Jong et al., 2008) positive  negative  positive Negative 
and not 
significant 
negative Negative 
and not 
significant 
Taxation: negative 
and positive 
(average tax rate) 
  
Source: own creation 
Appendix 6: Correlation matrix for the sample used in Probit Model (left down) and second part Ordinary Least Squares (right up) 
 D LEV LIQ INV RISK NDTS PROFT GWO TAX1 TAX2 TNG SZ1 SZ2 UNIQ 
D 1 - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
Leverage (BVTD/BVTA) (%)  1 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.2 -0.2 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.3 -0.2 0.1 -0.1 
Liquidity (CA/CL) (%) 0.0 - 1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Investment ((FAt – FAt-
1+D&A)/TA) (%) 
0.0 - 0.0 1 0.0 0.4 -0.2 0.4 -0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 
Risk (ΔEBIT/TA) (%) 0.0 - 0.1 0.0 1 0.0 -0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Non-debt Tax Shields 
(D&A/TA) (%) 
0.1 - -0.1 -0.3 0.0 1 -0.3 0.0 -0.2 0.0 0.2 0.1 0.0 0.0 
Profitability (ROA) (%) -0.1 - 0.0 0.4 0.0 -0.4 1 -0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 
Growth opp. (% Δ of TA) 0.0 - 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.1 
Taxes1 (Average tax rate) 0.1 - 0.1 0.0 0.0 -0.1 0.0 0.0 1 0.1 -0.2 0.0 -0.2 0.0 
Taxes2 ((EBT-EAT)/EBT) (%) 0.0 - 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Tangibility (FA/TA) (%) 0.1 - -0.1 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 -0.2 0.0 1 -0.3 0.2 -0.1 
Size1 (ln(S)) -0.1 - -0.1 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.4 1 0.2 0.1 
Size2 (ln(TA)) 0.0 - 0.0 0.3 0.0 -0.2 0.1 0.0 -0.1 0.0 0.1 0.4 1 0.0 
Product Uniqueness (R&D/S) 
(%) 
0.0 - 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1 
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Appendix 7. Correlation Matrix (High-leveraged firms on the left down, non-high-leveraged firms on the right up) 
This table presents the correlation matrix between the dependent and independent variables. The data on the left down corresponds to the correlation matrix of the high-
leveraged firms, while the data on the right up refers to the correlation matrix for the non-high-leveraged firms. These correlation matrixes were built in order to identify any 
high correlation (higher than 0.5) from which the multicollinearity problem could arise. The variables growth opportunities and investment present high correlation for the high-
leveraged firm 
 LEV LIQ INV RISK NDTS PROFT GWO TAXS TAX2 TNG SZ1 SZ2 UNIQ 
Leverage (BVTD/BVTA) (%) 1 -0.1 0.0 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.2 -0.1 0.1 0.0 
Liquidity (CA/CL) (%) 0.0 1 0.0 0.1 -0.1 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 -0.1 -0.2 0.0 0.0 
Investment ((FAt – FAt-
1+D&A)/TA) (%) 
0.1 0.0 1 0.0 -0.6 0.6 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.0 
Risk (ΔEBIT/TA) (%) 0.0 0.0 0.0 1 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.1 0.0 0.0 
Non-debt Tax Shields 
(D&A/TA) (%) 
0.2 0.0 0.4 0.0 1 -0.4 0.0 -0.1 0.0 0.2 
0.0 
 
-0.4 0.0 
Profitability (ROA) (%) -0.2 0.0 -0.2 0.0 -0.4 1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.2 0.0 
Growth opp. (% Δ of TA) 0.1 0.0 0.5 0.0 0.0 -0.1 1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Taxes1 (average tax rate) -0.1 0.0 -0.1 0.0 -0.2 0.0 0.0 1 0.0 
-0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Taxes2 ((EBT-EAT)/EBT) (%) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Tangibility (FA/TA) (%) 0.3 -0.1 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 -0.1 0.0 1 -0.5 0.0 0.0 
Size1 (ln(S)) -0.1 -0.1 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.3 1 0.4 0.0 
Size2 (ln(TA)) 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 -0.2 0.0 0.3 0.3 1 0.0 
Product Uniqueness (R&D/S) 
(%) 
-0.1 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 1 
Source: own creation 
 
